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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays on public finance. The first two are closely related
to each other, studying the tax policies in Chinese car markets. The third one on the corporate
income tax rate and firm innovation is not closely related to the first two. All three essays are
answering how the tax systems affect consumer and firm behavior and its welfare implication.
They demonstrate my interest in applying economic reasoning to the design and evaluation of
public policy.
The first chapter is an empirical examination of how tax incentives stimulates the car market
and its environmental cost. Stimulating durable goods purchases is especially crucial during re-
cessions and many stimulus policies target environmental-friendly products. However, there is
little evidence on the consequences of these policies, both in terms of stimulus and environmental
impact. We seek such evidence by evaluating important recent fiscal stimulus programs in the Chi-
nese passenger car market: tax holidays and cash subsidies for the purchase of new small engine
cars. This chapter shows the impact of tax incentives using national administrative car registration
data from the years 2005-2018. The results show that a one percentage point sales tax decrease
increases the total sales of targeted small cars by about 3.2% and decreases sales of their substi-
tutes, cars with slightly larger sized engines, by 3.9%. Overall, the stimulus effect dominates the
substitution effect and the total additional spending goes up by approximately 30 billion USD. In
terms of environmental impact, the net increase in carbon emissions imposes a social cost as high
as 11.4 billion USD.
The second chapter, with Jianjun Li, studies tax incidence on its own product and close substi-
tutes in a multi-product oligopoly setting. We study a tax change in China’s car market that lowers
the tax rate from 10% to 5% for cars with small engines. Using transaction-level tax adminis-
trative data we show that consumer price for small cars drops by approximately 4.3% and their
competitors’ price also dropped by 0.6%. We consider the pass-through on close substitutes in a
multi-product oligopoly setting where firms need to take cannibalization effect into consideration
when they respond to a tax change on some of their product. Our analysis shows market share of
the target product matters for the incidence of its substitutes.
The third chapter, with Jing Cai and Yuyu Chen, exploits a tax reform on manufacturing firms in
China to study the impact of taxes on firm innovation. The reform switched the corporate income
ix
tax collection from the local to the state tax bureau and reduced the tax rate by 10%. The reform
only applied to firms established after January 2002, allowing us to use regression discontinuity
design as the identification strategy. The results show that lower taxes improved both quantity and
quality of firm innovation. Moreover, the reform has a bigger impact on firms that are financially
constrained and firms that engage more in tax avoidance.
x
CHAPTER 1
Stimulating the Car Market at an Environmental
Cost: Evidence from Fiscal Stimulus in China
Many governments use fiscal policies to smooth business cycles by affecting the purchase of capi-
tal goods or durable goods, for instance, bonus investment depreciation, ‘Cash for Clunkers’ in the
United States and Germany, and housing transaction tax holidays in the United Kingdom. Under-
standing behavioral responses to policies is important when debating whether the government can
spur economic activity through fiscal interventions [Zwick and Mahon, 2017, House and Shapiro,
2008]. How well fiscal stimulus works has gained more attention, especially when the interest
rate is low. In practice, most fiscal stimulus design only targets selective environmental friendly
goods such as fuel efficient cars and appliances. It is intended to substitute away from high energy
consumption products; however, if the stimulus effect is substantial, it may impose an additional
cost on the environment because induced purchases that would not happen without the stimulus
could dominate the substitution effect. Improving policy design requires knowledge about the im-
pact of taxation on targeted goods and their close substitutes. There is scant evidence of how tax
incentives change consumption. The lacking of comprehensive microdata and the inability to con-
struct counterfactual scenarios, makes it difficult to evaluate the policies’ impact on stimulating
and correcting negative externalities.
This paper uses administrative passenger car registration data in China from 2005 to 2018 to
study two important temporary stimulus policies in China’s car market and evaluates their impact
on carbon emission. The stimulus programs are tax holidays, which occurred in two waves and
cash subsidies, which occurred in three waves. Only cars with small engines sold in a certain period
were eligible for the programs and both programs surprised the market. We use the variation in
eligibility and time to identify the causal impact. The temporary changes in taxes and subsidies
could affect consumer behavior in three ways: 1) The extensive margin effect: Consumers who
were not planning to buy a car during the stimulus period prior to the policy enactment. They
can be a first time owner of a vehicle or an existing owner who takes advantage of the policies
to replace an old car. The additional sales inform us about the strength of the fiscal stimulating
1
effect. 2) The retiming effect: Consumers who were planning to purchase after the policy period
are pulled forward into the policy period. 3) The substitution effect: Consumers who were going
to buy larger cars during or after the policy period switch to an eligible small model because they
are now relatively cheaper.
The two most important fiscal programs are implemented as follows. The first stimulus program
consists of two waves of car acquisition taxes. To combat the financial crisis, in January 2009 the
car acquisition tax was halved from ten percent to five percent on small cars with an engine size
less than 1.6 liters. The tax was raised to 7.5 percent in January, 2010 and returned to the original
ten percent in January 2011. The tax holiday was only announced a week before implementation,
and included the end of the holiday. From October, 2015 to December, 2017, a similar tax holiday
was again implemented .
The other stimulus program was a lump-sum subsidy to selected fuel efficient small cars from
June, 2010 to September, 2015. To be eligible for a 3000 Yuan (442 USD) subsidy cars needed to
meet several requirements; the most important one was engine size less than 1.6L. In addition to
the engine size restriction the car also needed to meet certain fuel consumption standards [Chen
et al., 2017]. There are three waves with ten lists of cars for the subsidy program. More details on
the policies and how they change the effective tax rates are provided in section two. The beginning
of each subsidy is a surprise to the market and firms know when the subsidy expires at least one
month before it is announced.1
A difference-in-differences methodology is employed to estimate the stimulus policies’ causal
impact on small cars and their substitute sales. The first step categorizes the unaffected cars into
substitutes and control groups. The policies studied only target small cars with engine sizes smaller
than 1.6 liters, an important determinant of car performance. However, engine size alone is insuffi-
cient to construct a valid control group since many other factors are also important considerations
for consumers. We solve this problem by taking both engine size and price into consideration. The
vast majority of policy targets are relatively cheaper cars. We use larger and more expensive cars
to construct the counterfactual of the small car sales. What is left in between the small cars and
control group cars are mid-sized engine cars or larger cars whose prices are close enough to small
cars. We study the substitution effect on these cars.
We classify cars into four groups based on the features of the two stimulus policies: group one
only includes cars that are eligible for the acquisition tax holidays but not eligible for the cash
subsidy program; group two includes all the subsidized smaller cars and we classify cars into this
group if the car is ever selected; group three includes cars that are never eligible for any of the tax
1The subsidy program’s timing was based on the total amount of money the government has and all information
is publicly available. The first and second waves of the subsidy program didn’t announce the ending date. However,
industry experts and dealers know the total amount of funding the financial department has and infer the end date at
least one month before the formal announcement.
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incentives but are competing with the treated smaller cars; the fourth group consists of cars that
are not going to be affected indirectly by the policies, large and expensive cars.
Our empirical analysis yields several interesting findings. First, if the tax rate for smaller cars
decreases one percentage point, their sales will increase by 3.2%, only less than 1% of the total
increase comes from consumers who advance their purchase to enjoy the tax cut. This implies
a large-scale stimulating effect. More important, fiscal policies also have indirect effects on in-
eligible cars that compete with small cars. The sales of substitutes of the small cars decrease by
3.9% when the small car tax rate decreases by one percentage point, which implies the tax holidays
stimulated total sales by 11.2%.
Besides the important implications on fiscal stimulus, the findings shed light on another big
issue: the net impact of a stimulus policy’s impact on the environment, especially when both
extensive and substitution effects work together. The automobile industry is an important part
of fulfilling the promise of China’s goal to contain carbon emissions. In the 2016 Paris climate
agreement the Chinese government promised to reduce carbon emissions from 2005 levels more
than 60% by 2030. In 2019 the carbon emissions for automobiles account for about 8% of the total
carbon emissions in China. Promised policies need to balance the fiscal stimulus effect and any
increased carbon emission from cars that would not have been purchased without the policy. This
paper aims to provide estimates to thoroughly evaluate the cost and benefit of the policies .
The tax incentives on smaller cars have an ambiguous impact on total emissions from driving
[Andersson, 2017]. On one hand, lower taxes on smaller cars attract medium car buyers and
reduces carbon emission; on the other hand, the stimulus effect increases carbon emissions by
putting more cars on the road. The net impact on carbon emissions remains an empirical question
that can be answered by three effects we identify in our paper. We use the estimated effects on car
sales to calculate the impact on carbon emissions and find unintended consequences of the green
stimulus: net carbon emissions increase because of the sizeable extensive margin response. The
total increase of carbon emissions is approximately 2.1% of total emissions in 2014.The implied
social cost could be as high as 11.4 billion USD, supposing the estimated marginal social cost of
carbon emission per metric ton is 68 USD at a discount rate of 2.5%.
Our paper builds on and contributes to three main literatures. First, we contribute to a growing
literature that studies the effect of tax policy on stimulus. Mian and Sufi [2012] evaluate the
impact of the 2009 U.S. “Cash for Clunkers” program on short-and medium-run auto purchases.
They find the effect was significantly more short-lived than previously suggested. The stimulus
effect is reversed within ten months after the policy. Unlike the Cash for Clunkers Program design,
consumers in China did not need to trade in their old car to get the subsidy. We focus on tax
incentives for all new car purchases that potentially attract more marginal consumers who would
not buy a new car without the policies. Tax incentives are also widely used to stimulate other
3
durable goods consumption. Best and Kleven [2017] and Berger et al. [2018] study the housing
market and found substantial extensive margin response to temporal tax incentives. The temporary
tax exemption is also provided to encourage investment. House and Shapiro [2008] and Zwick
and Mahon [2017] study the investment response on equipment of 2001 to 2004 temporary tax
incentives. Another contribution to the body of literature that examines the Chinese auto market,
which is the largest market in the world today but still barely studied by the literature. Other
emerging market may benefit from the knowledge we learnt from China.
Our second contribution is identifying the effect of taxation on close substitutes. It is generally
believed cross product tax effect is negative, the theoretical prediction is unambiguous in standard
industrial organization models. Models that focus on search cost also predict a decrease in small
car prices could have a positive effect on medium car sales: Because consumers start to pay more
attention to the car market and as they acquire more knowledge for cars, some of them will decide
to buy a medium-size car [Ke and Lin, 2020]. The cross product effect of taxation remains an
empirical question and little attention has been given to the magnitude of the cross elasticity of
taxation on close substitutes. Chen et al. [2017], for example find the impact of the first two waves
of the subsidy programs on fuel efficient cars reduced sales of non-subsidized cars. We contribute
to the public finance literature by adding clear evidence on the cross product effect. Understanding
the cross product impact of tax policies has broad implications since many tax tools are targeted on
certain products such as soda taxes based on sugar per liter, cigarette taxes based on E-cigarette or
not, and tariffs on specific products and housing transaction taxes based on the size of the house.
We show the importance of considering the overall impact of such policy changes.
This paper also contributes to the growing environmental literature by evaluating the net effect
of green stimulus policies. The ‘Cash for Clunkers’ program has been widely implemented and
studied in developed countries [Li et al., 2013, Mian and Sufi, 2012]. We provide a full evaluation
of similar programs in developing countries. Some studies have already pointed out that the green
stimulus may actually increase emissions if not carefully designed [Davis et al., 2014]. We find a
similar undesired consequence on carbon emissions. To our best knowledge, this is the first paper
that carefully incorporates the impact on the used car market to analyse the overall environmental
consequences. Our results deliver a clear policy implication: A fiscal stimulus policy on car market
can impose an environmental cost because it induces substantial additional purchases. However, if
the induced scrapping rate is high enough we can keep the environment cost at a low level.
This paper only considers the additional carbon emission effect from driving cars. Data limita-
tion do not allow further investigations to the production side. Without knowing the alternatives if
consumers do not buy cars, we cannot have precise estimates the emissions from the the produc-
tion side. If car production emits more carbon dioxide than possible alternatives, our result tell us
a lower bound estimates of the environmental cost.
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A key feature of our analysis is the use of high-quality microdata. For this analysis we were
granted access to transaction-level car sales data from 2005 to 2018 in China. The most important
advantage of Chinese data we have product code for each car and in China auto market there is
very little room for options. We can treat cars with the same product code as the same cars. In
contrast, the primary source of data used in most other countries does not have this feature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we briefly describe the
Chinese passenger car market and the policy details; in section three we introduce our data and
construction of the control group; next we show our empirical strategy and present results in
detail; finally, we conclude and offer suggestions for future research.
1.1 Institutional Background
1.1.1 China’s Passenger Car Market
China’s automobile market started to grow with the economic reform of the 1980s. The automo-
bile industry is capital and technology intensive, the central government treats it as the pillars of
the economy. In 1994 the National Development and Reform Commission initiated a program on
Development of Automotive Industry aiming to giving priority to foreign investors with advanced
technologies to create joint ventures with SOEs (state-owned enterprises). Attracted by these poli-
cies, most global car manufacturers began to establish joint ventures in China, and after China’s
entrance into the World Trade Organization (WTO) the number of them surged eve further.
China’s passenger market has been growing rapidly and features a strong seasonal pattern. Over
the last two decades, the sale of passenger vehicles has increased by an annual growth rate of 20%.
Vehicle sales stepped up from 1.3 million in 1994 to 24.2 million in 2017. Since 2009, it has been
the largest global passenger car market, with yearly sales exceeding ten million2. In figure B.2
and A.2 we compare size of car market over time across countries. The car industry is especially
important for China as more than 92% of cars are domestically produced. The volatility at the end
of each year is due to the Chinese lunar year, a one-week-long holiday most important national
holiday in January or February, and most business stops. As a result, the sales during the month of
the Chinese lunar year drop because people advance their purchases the month before. The number
of makes increased dramatically from less than 30 in 1995 to more than 70 in 2001 then to 396 in
2009. The number of car producers became stable after 2004. The top 10 firms’ market share was
over 90% in early 2000 but was reduced to 70% in 2010. There are 101 car companies in 2018 in
2Light trucks are not included in this figure. The market size of light trucks is as large as the passenger car market
and they are used for commuting.
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total. Foreign firms must become a joint venture if they produce in China before 2019, and they
can not hold more than 50% of the share.
Hu et al. [2014] finds no evidence for within or cross-group price collusion in China’s auto
industry, which suggests that the benefit is likely go to consumers. Small cars consumers are
price sensitive, according to [Barwick et al., 2017] the price elasticity for small cars is around 4.2.
Together these give us a prior that the potential response of the stimulus policy is not too small.
To the broader literature on the auto industry study, we compare our results with the estimates
of price elasticity with respect to tax rate is the product of tax incidence and price elasticity. We do
not have available in China’s market. Estimates from other scholars suggest a high pass-through
to consumers in this market. Our results are in line with the current estimates.
1.1.2 Efforts to Mitigate the Environmental Cost
With the rapid development of auto industry, China is also facing the challenge from air pollution
associated with cars. For example, according to China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection
(Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2010), vehicle emissions have become the main source of
air pollution in Chinese cities, Both central and local governments have made efforts to mitigate
the negative externalities. Xiao and Ju [2014] evaluates the consumption-tax based on engine size
and fuel-tax adjustments in the Chinese automobile industry and did not find evidence supporting
that the consumption tax can decrease fuel consumption. One possible explanation is the change
of consumption tax only affect very small share of cars in the market. While in our paper the tax
policies are targeting more than 70% of cars.
Besides the measures in tax policies, some local government implement more strict restrictions
on vehicle usage. Beijing applied the odd-even license plate rule [Chen et al., 2013] and later
on started to directly limit the number of new car registration. Shanghai, Tianjin and Hangzhou
followed Beijing’s policy on car ownership (Xiao et al,2017; Li, 2017). The above studies have
shown that car usage restrictions indeed reduced the car sales and remarkably reduce pollution.
By construction the car registration restriction policy does not allow for the tax reduction to be an
effective stimulus policy. In our estimation we also use the sample that excludes the cities with car
registration policies.
1.1.3 Car Acquisition Tax and Cash Subsidy Policies
The acquisition tax is only levied on first-time car purchasers and based on the pre-value added
tax price. There are two waves of tax holidays: On January 14th,2009, the official announcement
came out saying from January 20th to December 30th, 2009, for vehicles with displacement level
smaller than 1.6L, the acquisition tax rate will be 5%. At the end of 2009, the central government
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compromised with car producers, and extended the holiday for another year with a higher rate
at 7.5%. Starting from January 2011, the tax rate goes back to its original level at 10 percent.
The beginning of the holiday is a surprise to the market, but the expiration is fully anticipated.
The second wave is structured in the same way. It is announced on September 29th, 2015 and
implements a 5% tax rate from October 1st, 2015 to Dec 31st 2016, and 7.5% until Dec 31st 2017.
The policy effect also depends on the compliance of the acquisition tax. The acquisition tax is
enforced by the traffic police, which is part of China’s security system. The owner can not get a
license plate from traffic police unless he/she remits the tax. Chain paperwork certifies the whole
process from the tax invoice to the license plate. The potential corruption is easily detected, if any.
We should not worry much about compliance with the acquisition tax regarding whether paying
anything or not. However, the intensive margin of tax avoidance is still possible. The dealer can
report a lower transaction price to the IRS and make a cash transfer under the table.
1.1.4 Fuel efficient Car Subsidy Program
To encourage the purchase of more fuel efficient cars, China’s Department of the Treasury and Min-
istry of Industry and Information Technology decided to give a lump-sum subsidy to all selected
Fuel efficient cars as an independent program of the tax holiday. The average market suggested
retail price (MSRP) for the eligible cars is about 80000 Yuan, and the subsidy is equivalent to a
3.375% sales tax deduction. To be eligible for the 3000 Yuan (450 USD) subsidy, the car needs to
meet several requirements 1) displacement level smaller than 1.6 liters; 2) MPG (Miles per gallon),
and emission level meets some national standard. If the car meets these criterion, firms can apply
for the subsidy and get the money once they are sold. The dealers will deduct 3000 Yuan from
sales price and get it back from the finance department in practice. The program was announced
in May 2010, and the first list was published on June 21st 2010. The list got extended every two or
three months. At the end of the first wave subsidy, there are six lists in total. In October of 2011,
the central government decided to put a higher criterion for eligibility and renewed the list. The
number of subsidized models dropped from around 423 to around 49 when the listed got renewed,
and 30 models from the first wave remained. Several months later, the list got extended again. The
second wave stopped on Sep 30th, 2013. The third wave of subsidy started one year later, from
October 1st, 2014 to Dec 31th, 2015. We summarize the whole schedule of the three waves of
subsidy program in Table 1.1. In Figure 3.8 we show the timeline of the tax holiday and subsidy
programs and how they interact with each other.
To qualify for the program, car manufacturers need to submit applications for their vehicles
to the government. After receiving an application for a particular vehicle model, the government
would verify its attributes and decide whether the vehicle model was eligible.
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Insert Figure 3.8, Table 1.1
Figure 1.2 summarizes the complicated tax schedule due to the two policies using the first wave
tax holiday and subsidy as an example. We divide cars into three groups: 1) smaller cars that get
the partial tax exemption but no subsidy, 2) smaller cars that get both and 3) larger car with no
tax rate change. The average price of a smaller car is 80,000 Yuan (around 11400 USD) and we
convert the 3,000 Yuan (around 450 USD) subsidy into a tax deduction.
Insert Figure 1.2
1.1.5 Other Taxes Levied on Cars
There are three major indirect taxes on cars: consumption tax, value-added tax (VAT) and acqui-
sition tax. In addition car producers also need to remit consumption tax in addition when selling
a car to the retailer. The tax rate varies from 3% to 20%, depending on the engine size. The con-
sumption tax rate also changed on Sep 1st, 2008. A 17% VAT is also levied on the sales price and
remitted when the transaction happens. 3 The listed price of a car is the VAT included price, and
it’s the dealer’s responsibility to remit VAT.
Acquisition tax remittance in practice: The dealer will provide a roughly estimated amount of
tax based on the transaction price. The actual taxable value might be higher than the reported
transaction price. This is because the IRS puts a guidance price for each model and updates it from
a recent transaction record. The guidance price is designed to prevent potential tax evasion, so this
information is not declared to dealers.
1.1.6 The Salience of the Policies
For the policy to be effective, the consumers need to be aware of the policy. Figure A.3 and A.4
in the appendix shows the search trend for “Car acquisition tax” in Chinese. We see two spikes in
Jan 2009 and Jan 2010, suggesting that consumers know well about the policy. One thing worth
noticing is that at the beginning of 2009 and the end of 2009 and 2010, the attention is much
higher than other periods. This implies the potential short term timing response. Google search is
not available in China after 2013, and we supplement the search trend using the domestic search
engine (Baidu).
Insert Figure A.3 and A.4
3The VAT rate decreased to 16% since May 1st, 2018.
8
1.1.7 Other Determinants of the Car Market
In this section, we investigate how other determinants change with the timing of the tax incentives.
In figure A.6 and A.7 we show the correlation between small and large car sales and consumer
confidence index (CCI) separately. We do see that CCI is an important predictor to explain the
trend of car sales. CCI quickly bounces back after the financial crisis, and we see that sales of
large cars also started to increase in January 2009 when the first tax holiday started. The decrease
in CCI in 2018 also explains the drop in car sales in the same period.
Insert Figure A.6 and A.7
In addition, we are concerned that the gas price change potentially drives the effect of tax
incentives. The increase in gas prices is also going to make smaller and fuel efficient cars more
favorable. In figure A.8, we show the evolution of the national gas retailing price, and we see
the gas price had already started to rise in January 2008, and in later periods, it is not positively
correlated with the tax rate changes.
1.2 Data and Construction of Control group
1.2.1 Car Registration Data
The best available data to capture car sales information in China comes from the Department of
National Security registration level data. The data set is also called “China Car Registration Data
Set.” We can access data from 2005 to 2018 to evaluate the impact of the policies. The data
set contains information such as register year, month, province, producer, brand, model, vehicle
type, fuel type, engine capacity, gearbox, car shape, color, usage, ownership, buyer’s age, and
gender. Each car must register at the traffic policy department to get the license plate, and the law
is well implemented. The register month is a good proxy of purchase time. Model is important
information here; unlike the U.S. market, in the Chinese auto market, there is very little room for
options. We can treat cars with the same model as the same cars. The only available information on
price is the market suggested retail price (MSRP), and we know each car’s MSRP when it entered
the market. The MSRP is at the trim level and each trim may correspond to several models. We
match all the possible products and take the mean of the highest and lowest price.
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1.2.2 Other Data Sets
In our empirical analysis, we need to control for the potential impacts of other determinants of
the car market including: consumer confidence index and gas price. We collect these information
from CEIC database. The fuel emission data comes from the Ministry of Industry and Information
Technology. Since 2010, all new cars in China are required to disclose their fuel efficiency which
is tested by a third-party research institution.
1.2.3 Summary Statistics
In Table 1.3 we provide summary statistics for the main variables at the vehicle level in the final
sample. The average monthly sales number for a vehicle model in a province is 38.9. The average
engine size, fuel inefficiency, gasoline expenditure, horsepower, and weight are 1.8 liters, 8 liters
per 100 kilometers, 50 RMB per 100 kilometers, 93 kilowatts, and 1345 kg, respectively.
Insert Table 1.3
1.2.4 Constructing Control Group
The policy designs allow us to employ the difference-in-differences strategy to estimate the causal
impact of the policies. Before showing the graphical and estimation result, we discuss how we
construct the control and substitutable groups. We use the displacement level, and market sug-
gested retail price (MSRP) to construct small cars’ counterfactual. A valid control group should
not be affected by the tax holiday and has a similar growth rate with the small cars absent from the
policy. The natural criterion is engine size, given the policy. People care about displacement level
because it is one of the most important parts of a car that determines car performance, such as fuel
consumption and horsepower. In Figure 1.3, we plot the correlation between engine size and gas
consumption per 100 kilometers (GPK). First, we observe a positive correlation between engine
size and GPK; note that the variance conditional on engine size is also large. This motivates us to
utilize more information to construct the control group. We need to know the top considerations
for consumers and use them to separate cars into different markets. A tax policy targeted on some
cars from the low-end market should not affect the high-end market. We went to the most pop-
ular phone app in China “Dongchedi” (meaning Car Expert in Chinese) and took a screenshot as
shown in Figure A.5. When a consumer indicates that he or she is interested in buying a new car,
the system asks for the preference for brand first then immediately requests desired price range
and half of their space to collect this information. This fact indicates that the most important factor
for market segmentation is price. Our conversations with sales people at dealership confirms this
argument. In addition to engine size, we use price to construct the control group and substitutable
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group. Figure 1.4 shows the price distribution of three groups of cars with the same scale on the
X-axis (Price). All cars above 1.6L are not directly affected by the policy. From Figure 1.3 and our
conversations with car dealers, we notice that a watershed in China’s auto market is 2.0L, and cars
above 2.0L are generally considered to be more comfortable and luxurious. We call cars between
1.6L and 2.0L (including 2.0L) medium cars and those above 2.0L larger cars.
The first observation from Figure 1.4 is that most of the smaller cars (Up-left) are cheaper than
200,000 Yuan (28,000 USD), but larger cars (Down-left) are more expensive in general, but the
overlap in price is still not negligible. We also observe a bimodal distribution for the medium cars,
competing with both small and larger cars. Again, this fact justifies the importance of using price
information to further classify cars into different markets. We use 1) cars that are above 2.0L and
more expensive than 200,000 Yuan or 2) cars above 1.6L and more expensive than 250,000 Yuan
as a control group. Furthermore, we treat the large cars with a price lower than 200,000 Yuan
and medium cars with a price lower than 250,000 Yuan as substitutable cars. In the robustness
check section, we drop some very close models to the cutoffs and use stricter or weaker criteria
for constructing control groups. Our main result does not change much.
Insert Figure 1.3 and 1.4
Given the policy and car market structure we divide all cars into four categories:
Low-end market

Tax holiday only group: never subsidized small cars
Tax holiday and subsidy group: subsidized small cars
Substitutable group: median or large cars that are also cheaper
High-end market (control group): median or large cars that are expensive
1.3 Graphical Evidence
We first look at the impact of the tax holidays on small car sales in Figure 1.5. The treatment group
is all cars eligible for the tax holidays, and some selective models are eligible for the subsidy. The
blue line represents the sum of sales of all cars with engine size smaller than 1.6L, and the green
line represents sales of the control group. We observe that the monthly sales from 2005 to 2008
for both groups are stable and parallel. The three green dashed lines correspond to the beginning
and end of tax holidays. The two golden lines correspond to the beginning and end of the three
waves of subsidy programs, and there are no stimulus policies during the year between the two
11
blue lines. We calculate the tax rate for small cars with the subsidy in the red dashed dots to
capture the policy variation. We take the logarithm of the data to reduce the variance and make the
time series linear in Figure 1.6. In January 2009, small car sales started to surge when the policy
was implemented and immediately dropped a lot in January 2010 and January 2011, right after the
exemption period. The second wave shows a very similar pattern. Note that the fuel-efficient car
subsidy policy targeted on selective smaller cars starts in June 2010, and the amount of subsidy
equals the amount of tax exemption. So we observe the gap between the treated and control group
continues to grow even after the holiday.
We can also observe strong retiming effect. A spike in sales is always in January during years
without holidays because of the Chinese Lunar Year effect described in section two. But during
the tax holiday period, the end of year spike of small car sales is pulled to December in the year
before to enjoy the tax cut while the large car’s sales spike is still in February.
Insert Figure 1.5 and Figure 1.6
Next, we show visual evidence of the substitution effect. In Figure 1.7, we compare the sales
trend for substitutable and control groups. The blue line represents the sales of small cars’ substi-
tutes, and the green line represents sales of the control group. The effect is more clear demonstrated
in Figure 1.8 after log linearization. Again we observe that sales trends are parallel before the first
tax holiday starts. Furthermore, the sales start to diverge right after the tax holiday. However, from
September 2013 to September 2014, we also see a gap when no stimulus policies are in place. The
gap could reflect a difference in trends in the long term. To be conservative, we also controlled for
group-specific trend and province-specific trend in our regressions to account for the growth rate
difference.
Insert Figure 1.7 and Figure 1.8
We also look at the size and impact of the subsidy program separately by plotting sales of the
small but never subsidized car (a model with a small engine but never selected into the subsidy
program) in Figure 1.9 and subsidized cars (if a model is ever subsidized) in Figure 1.10. We
compare with the control group to detect the causal impact. The first golden lines are the beginning
and end of the policy. The first wave is from June 2010 (first golden line) to September 2011;
the second wave is from October 2011 to October 2013 (the first blue line), and the third wave
is from October 2014 (the second blue line) to December 2015 (the second golden line). The
stimulus impact is clearly shown in Figure 1.10, the sales of subsidized cars increased significantly
during the subsidy period. Because there were few sales in previous years for those models for the
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subsidized cars, we use the sales level instead of the natural logarithm. We also show the log of
sales in Figure A.9.
We also observe a strong substitution effect from Figure 1.9, right after the subsidy program
began in June 2010, non-subsidy car sales start to drop. Note that the drop in sales during the
subsidy period is large, but we also need to take model exit and entry decisions into account. Some
models that are already available before the subsidy program will exit given the life cycle of nature.
A more precise inference of the subsidy program’s magnitude requires a within model fixed effect
in the estimation. We show the results in the next section.
Insert Figure 1.9 and 1.10
In the last part of the graphical evidence, Figure 1.11 demonstrates how the three waves of
subsidy phase in and phase out and how they interact with the tax holiday. The blue line represents
the monthly sales of the never subsidized cars. The red, green, and orange lines represent the
monthly sales of waves one, two, and three. If a model is ever included in wave one, no matter
when it starts to be subsidized, it will be coded as wave one subsidized cars. The same rule applies
to wave two and three. The first dashed blue line is the beginning of wave one, then in the month
labeled by the red line, the list got renewed, and the second wave replaced wave one. Wave two
stops at the second solid blue line. After one year, wave three started in Oct 2014 and lasted till
December 2015.
By breaking down the three waves, we can detect clear evidence of the retiming effect in
Figure 1.11: consumer advance their purchase the month before the subsidy expires. We also see
a substitution effect on non-subsidized cars. For instance, when the wave two lists replaced wave
one in October 2011, wave one subsidized cars dropped immediately.
Insert Figure 1.11
1.4 Empirical Results
To establish the causal impact of the policy we employ the difference-in-differences estimation
strategy and the classification is consistent with the graphical evidence part. In the robustness
check section, we will use a different criterion for constructing control group. We model car sale
as a function of its own tax rate and its substitute’s tax rate, more specifically we use the following
specification after aggregating data at the province-month-model level:
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Ln(salesij t) = β0 + β1Tax Ownit + β2Tax Compeit + θt+p
∑k
p=−k ∆Tax Ownit+p +
γt+p
∑k
p=−k ∆Tax Compeit+p + β3Xgt + αi + αj + αt + αit + αgt + εij t (1.1)
Ln(salesij t) is the natural logarithm of model i car’s sales in province j during month t. αi,
αj and αt are the province, model and month-of-sample fixed effects, αit and αgt are the province
and group-specific linear time trend. Controlling for the model fixed effect is crucial for our iden-
tification. Model entry and exit decisions can coincide with the policy change and affect sales
in different groups. If more tax exempted models are introduced to the market when the tax rate
decreases we will overestimate the policy impact. By controlling for the model fixed effect, we
focus on the variation within models. Tax Ownit is the tax rate for cars of model i in month t.
Tax Compeit is the competitors’ tax rate. The vector ∆Tax Ownit+k and ∆Tax Compeit+k are
the change of tax rate corresponding to the kth month before (when k takes negative values) or
after (when k takes positive values) the tax holiday expiration date. They capture the anticipating
effect and the reversal effect. Xgt control for the differential effects of CCI and gas price on dif-
ferent groups of cars. We run three separate regressions for the three groups of cars. Following the
relationship in Table 1.2 we measure the tax rate for competitors as follows:
For the never subsidized small cars, Tax Ownit only takes 0.1, 0.05, and 0.075 depending on
t. For the subsidized car, they are eligible for both tax holiday and subsidy and for each model we
convert the subsidy into a model specific tax deduction, Tax Ownit equals tax rate given by tax
holiday subtracting 3000/MSRP. For group four Tax Ownit is always 0.1.
Unsubsidized small cars are competing with subsidized small cars and medium cars; we only
need to calculate Tax Compeit from subsidized cars since the tax rate for the substitution group
did not change. The average price of a smaller car is approximately 80,000 Yuan, and we convert
the 3,000 Yuan subsidy into a tax deduction. Note here we have ten lists of cars and for a given
month only a fraction of subsidized small cars is eligible for the subsidy. The effective tax rate of
the substitute is a weighted average of the subsidized and non-subsidized cars at a given month.
One potential problem of this measure is when a model gets the subsidy its sales will increase,
and we will put more weight on the subsidized car mechanically. To account for the endogeneity
problem we only take the ratio of the subsidized vehicle from the first month after a list is renewed.
Then we can estimate the intention to treatment effect. We use tax rate – 3.75*(Share of subsidized
cars in the first month when a list is released) as its effective tax rate on unsubsidized small cars.
For subsidized small cars Tax Compeit is unsubsidized small cars’ weighted average tax rate.
For substitutable group we use the weighted average tax rate of unsubsidized small and subsidized
small cars to construct Tax Compeit, and the idea is the same as how we construct Tax Compeit
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for unsubsidized small. For control group Tax Compeit always takes 0.1 since they only competes
with other larger cars.
The specification in equation (1) also allows us to identify the timing effect of the temporary
change of tax rate. θt+k and γt+k are a set of coefficients that capture the anticipated and lagged
effect of the tax rate changes. More specifically, The coefficient on the kth captures the additional
sales at the end of the holiday. When i takes negative values, we call it advanced period. And
coefficient on kth captures the drop of sales right after the holiday expires, we call it reversal
period when i takes positive values. We impose no prior on how long the advanced and reversal
period should be, using a flexible specification here, we start with one month and keep adding
controls until the last coefficient is no longer statistically and economically significant. In this
way, we pin down the length of the advanced and reversal periods. The beginning of the stimulus
is a surprise to consumers, but they fully anticipate the end of it. We should expect some consumers
were pulled forward and sales will drop immediately after the holiday.
We first look at the static elasticity of sales with respect to tax rates and discuss the timing
response later. From column (2) in Table 1.4 if the tax rate decreases one percentage point total
sales of unsubsidized small cars will increase by 9.6%. The effect is large and consistent with what
we see in the graphical evidence. The tax holidays decrease the average tax rate for unsubsidized
small car by 3.8=(1-0.05*24/(24+27)-0.75*27(27+24)), so the total sales of unsubsidized small
car were stimulated by 36.5% by its own tax decrease than if its own tax rate does not change. The
total sales of unsubsidized small car during the treated period (Tax Own decrease) is 4.1 ∗ 108, so
the stimulated sales are 9.7 ∗ 107 (4.1 ∗ 108-4.1 ∗ 108/1.31). We also account for the substitution
effect from subsidized small cars, if the weighted average tax rate of subsidized small increase by 1
percentage point, the sales of unsubsidized small will decrease by 2.6%. The tax holidays decrease
the average tax rate for subsidized small cars by 3.0% and thus decreases unsubsidized small car
sales by 7.2%. The total sales of unsubsidized small car during the treated period (Tax Compe
decrease) is 6.4 ∗ 108, so the sales are decreased by 4.9 ∗ 107 (6.4 ∗ 108/0.93-6.4 ∗ 108). The net
sales stimulated is 4.9∗107 cars. This is 7.6% of all small car sales during the stimulus period, and
this finding mirrors our graphical evidence.
Next, we look at the stimulating impact on subsidized smaller cars. From column (4) in Table
1.4 if the own tax rate decreases one percentage point total sales of subsidized small cars will
increase by 6.1% and the average effective tax rate decreased by 5%, thus 30.5% more subsidized
small was stimulated. The total sales of subsidized small car during the treated period (when
Tax Own decreases) is 2.5 ∗ 108, so the additional sales due to own tax rate decrease are 5.8 ∗ 107.
We also need to account for the substitution effect from unsubsidized small car. The average
effective rate decreases by 3.8% and the total substitution effect are 15.2%. The total sales of the
subsidized small car during unsubsidized small car tax rate decrease period is 7399457, so the
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decreased sales are 1.3 ∗ 107 (7.4 ∗ 107/0.85-7.4 ∗ 107). The net sales stimulated is 4.4 ∗ 107 cars.
This is 6.9% of all small car sales during the stimulus period. Combining this number with the
7.6% from unsubsidized small we can calculate the 14.5% of smaller car sales is stimulated by the
policy.
We still need to consider the loss of sales of medium cars. One percentage point tax decrease
will decrease the sale of medium cars by 3.0% and 4.7%. The corresponding sales of substitutable
cars of are 8.9∗106 and 1.25∗107, and around 15% of the sales are substituted away by small cars.
The total sales of substitutable car are so 3.7 ∗ 107 (2.1 ∗ 107/0.85-2.1 ∗ 107) which equals 14.7%
of total substitutable car sales during the stimulus period.
To evaluate the net impact of the tax holidays, we also need to know the retiming effect, es-
pecially whether the additional sales are reversed right after the policy expires. The identifying
assumption is the advanced and reversal period is a continuum. From column (2) in Table 1.4
and Table 1.5, We see one month before holiday expires we have a 10% additional sales for un-
subsidized small cars if tax rate is going to increase increase by one percentage point. There are
still additional sales two months before tax rate increases, but three months before the increase is
no longer economic or statistically significant. This implies consumers were only pulled forward
to the last two months the holiday. Similarly we look at the coefficients that captures the lagged
effects of tax rate changes and conclude that the temporary fiscal incentives only pull forward con-
sumers by up to one month. The average sales of the month before tax holiday expires is 1.4 ∗ 107,
and 2.0 ∗ 106 was pulled forward for each of these four months Part of the additional sales comes
from the months right after tax holiday expires. The average sales of the month after the tax hol-
iday expires is 6.2 ∗ 105 and 5.4 ∗ 104 cars are reversed. Note here the additional sales are not
reversed. Due to the limitation of our data we have to treat the whole month before tax increase as
the month for advancing purchase but this can be shorter and overestimate the advanced purchase.
This finding is also consistent with [Chen et al., 2017].
We do similar calculations for the subsidized small car. 17492 (2.4∗106-2.4∗106/1.077) average
monthly sales were pulled forward and 62639 (1.8∗106/0.74-1.8∗106) average monthly sales were
reversed. We also see a strong timing response to the 3000 Yuan lump-sum subsidy program. 26%
more sales are due to the retiming effect which equals 90580 (4.3 ∗ 106-4.3 ∗ 106/1.26) for each of
the three months. But for the subsidy program, we didn’t see a drop in sales when it expires. One
possible reason is the second and third wave ends right before October in which the first week is a
national holiday and a big sales month for auto and housing market. The net timing effect for the
subsidized small car is 153791 (17492*4-62639*3+90580*3).
For substitutable cars, the potential retiming response comes from buyers belonging to the post
policy period who switched to a smaller car to enjoy the tax holiday. If this effect is substantial,
we should expect a coefficient on the Lag of tax holiday and subsidy program to be significantly
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negative, and we see such effects from column (5) and (6) in Table 1.4.
Now we can combine the static elasticity and the timing effect. The size of additional car sales
equals to 5.6 ∗ 107. The more meaningful is the direct spending effect, and we plug in the average
MSRP to estimate the total spending impact. The total additional spending was 30 billion USD.
When calculating the stimulus effect, we assume consumers who switches from medium-sized cars
to small-engine cars will not adjust their total expenditure. So the net stimulus impact comes from
the total additional consumption
In the main specification we use within model tax variations only to capture the sales change
for the same model. This is an ideal way of estimating causal impact. However, if the model entry
and exit decision also responses to the stimulus policies, this specification may underestimate the
true effect if new eligible models are introduced because of the policies. We show the estimated
result without model fixed effect to capture the effect from entry and exit. In Table 1.6 we don’t
control for model fixed effect. The estimated impact became even larger and implied the model
entry, and exit dynamics won’t spoil our baseline results.
Insert Table 1.5, 1.6
1.4.1 Car Characteristic Adjustment
We plot the engine size distribution in different years. As we have discussed in section II that 1.6
liter is a golden size. Bunching blow the 1.6 liter threshold is already there before the tax holidays.
We look at the distribution of engine size. We do not find evidence on firms responding to the
temporary tax incentives by adjusting their engine size. We also look at if firm adjust car weight to
be eligible for the cash subsidy program and did not find evidence on that as in Chen et al. [2017].
1.5 Robustness Checks
In this section we use stricter criterion to construct the control group and substitution group. In
the first robustness in Table 1.7 we drop models that are very close to the cutoffs to avoid potential
inappropriate classifications. We drop all cars with engine size greater to 2.0 liter and smaller than
2.2 liter and we restrict all substitutable group models priced lower than 16,000 Yuan.
In the second robustness check in Table 1.8 we use weaker criteria for the control group: cars
that are above 2.0L and more expensive than 220,000 Yuan or 2) cars above 1.6L and more expen-
sive than 220,000 Yuan as a control group. Consequently, the large cars above 2.0L with a price
lower than 220,000 Yuan and medium cars with a price lower than 220,000 Yuan are substitutable
cars.
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In the third robustness check in Table 1.9 we impose stricter criteria for the control group:
cars that are above 2.2L and more expensive than 200,000 Yuan or 2) cars above 1.6L and more
expensive than 250,000 Yuan as a control group. Consequently, the large cars above 2.2L with
a price lower than 200,000 Yuan and medium cars with a price lower than 250,000 Yuan are
substitutable cars.
In all of the three robustness checks above, we replicate all results in Table 1.5. The result does
not change much compared with our baseline. Our result is not sensitive to the classification of
control and substitutable groups.
Insert Table 1.7 Table 1.8
1.6 Implication for Carbon Emissions
In this section, we discuss how the tax-induced behavior affects carbon emissions. The effect on
the environment comes from three parts: 1) Extensive margin response. An additional smaller car
only improves the environment if an old inefficient car is scrapped. Otherwise, it will only increase
the total emission, no matter whether the old one goes to the second-hand market or not. The net
impact depends on the fraction of used cars that are scrapped. We calculate the effect on emission
under different possible scrapping rates. 2) Retiming effect. The advanced purchase of smaller
cars will increase emissions due to the use in the advanced period. 3) Substitution effect. The
small cars crowd out medium car sales and subsidized fuel-efficient cars substitute inefficient cars
to reduce carbon emissions.
We obtain all the information on fuel-efficient cars from the Ministry of Industry and Informa-
tion Technology in China.4 Since 2010, all new cars in China are required to disclose their fuel
efficiency which is tested by a third-party research institution. We calculate the simple average of
fuel-efficient of all the models first and plug the common conversion factor that burning one Liter
of gasoline emits 0.0023 metric tons of CO2. In our calculation, we treat the emission from the
public sector as a constant. We assume that the new cars’ net change is not going to change the




                 Switch from substitutes ((Reduce emission)) 
 
                 Pull forward car purchase (Increase emission) 
Increase of  
new small cars     Stop taking public transportation (Increase emission) 
(measured)                            Scrap old car (Reduce emission) 
                        
                 Replace old car        
   
                                   Go to second hand market or export 
 (Does not change emission) 
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Based on the analysis above, we calculate the change in CO 2 emission following the formula
below:
Change of CO2 Emission=(1− α)×New Sale×EM Small×Lifespan×VUI)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Increase from extensive margin response
- Decrease sale×(EM Medium−EM Small)×Lifespan×VUI︸ ︷︷ ︸
Decrease from substitution effect from larger cars
- Decrease sale×(EM Subsidized−EM Nonsubsidized)×Lifespan×VUI︸ ︷︷ ︸
Decrease from substitution effect from Fuel efficient cars
−Forward Sale× (Months forward)/(Lifetime EM)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Increase from retiming effect
Where New Sale is the total net new sale from an extensive margin response. α captures the
rate of scrapping when a new car is sold because of the stimulus policy. The average life span of
cars in China is ten years, and we use data from 2008 to 2018 when the data is available to proxy
the difference in fuel consumption. The (1-α) percent of the total net new sales will increase the
emission. EM Small and EM Medium are the average emissions of small and medium cars from
burning one liter of gas, respectively. Lifespan is the average life span of a car, and VUI is vehicle
use intensity measured by how many kilometers a car travels per year. We follow Huo et al. [2012]
and Chen et al. [2017] who set lifespan and VUI to be ten years and 16900KM. Decrease sale
is the decrease in sales for medium cars from the substitution effect. The gap between medium
and small cars in emission will contribute to emission reduction through the substitution effect.
This substitution effect also comes from the substitution of subsidized small cars on unsubsidized
small cars. Also, the retiming response pulled 116483 cars forward for one month and emitted
more CO2. Forward sale is the amount of car that has been pulled forward, and we calculate the
emission for them by adjusting the length of forwarding (Months forward) and per month lifetime
emission of a car (Lifetime EM small per month).
The only thing we are still missing in equation (2) is the scrapping rate of stimulated sales.
From a report by China Center of Information, 20.6% of new purchased cars will replace an old
car and the official statistics of the overall scrapping rate is about 20% from 2011-2016.5. What
matters in our estimation is the total induced scrapped cars because the decrease of car prices. The
the estimated scrapping elasticity with respect to price is -3 [Bento et al., 2018]. If consumers bear
all the burden of taxation, combining the average price decrease from small cars, the weighted
5Technical report from Ministry of Commerce
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average price decreased by 1.5%. The total scrapped car from 2009 to 2017 is approximately 40.2
million. We calculate the implied α is approximately 0.1.6 We do not estimate how many cars are
scrapped or recycled due to the tax holiday in literature. To be more conservative, we calculate the
net carbon emission increase under different possible scrapping rate and Table 1.10 shows more
details. As we can see here, even under a 70% scrapping rate, which means 70% percent of new
purchases will push consumers to junk an old car, the net increase of carbon emission is still 0.06%.
We take 0.1 as our benchmark scrapping rate and conclude that the stimulating policies in-
creased CO2 pollution during year 2009 to 2017 on the environmental cost is approximately 2.1%
CO2 emission in year 2014 7
Other concerns about the estimation on carbon emission: 1) Rebounce effect. Other research
suggests that people tend to consume more gas if they buy more Fuel efficient cars. We do not have
access to individual level car usage data. However, the rebounce effect implies the reduction of
carbon emission from switching to smaller cars is smaller then what we calculated. This means our
result underestimates the net increase of carbon emission. We still draw a conservative conclusion.
2) Quality change. We also need to be careful about the fiscal incentive may change the quality
of cars. On one hand, as [Gulati et al., 2017] points out, consumers may switch to better smaller
cars because of income effect and the more expensive cars could be either more or less Fuel ef-
ficient. Another concern is consumers who took advantage of the tax holiday are more likely to
purchase a lower quality car because of liquidity constraint. Similar to the upgrading concern this
could also affect the Fuel efficient of additional sales. The overall tax holiday induced quality
change is ambiguous, we need to empirically exam how it changed the average GPK over time.
In figure A.10 we show the relationship between price and GPK and we did not find correlation
between them. This suggests that we should not worry much about the quality change concern.
Insert Table 1.10 and Figure A.10
1.7 Conclusion
This paper evaluates the consumption response to China’s two most important stimulus programs
of small-engine cars. Using national car sales data from the years 2005-2018, we show that a
one percentage point sales tax decrease increases the total sales of targeted small cars by about
3.2% and decreased sales of their substitutes by 3.9%. Overall, the stimulus effect dominates the
substitution effect. We provide clear evidence on tax policies’ stimulus and substitution effects and
highlight its importance when evaluating the policy implications on environment.
6Source:http://www.chyxx.com/industry/202001/831297.html
7In 2014 per capita CO2 emission is 7.5 metrics ton in China.
Source: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/en.atm.co2e.pc
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Based on the own and cross elasticities we estimated in the paper, we can calculate the net
impact on the fiscal programs’ carbon emissions. We find that the net increase in carbon emission
could impose a social cost as high as 11.2 billion USD. The optimal policy should take both the
benefit of fiscal stimulus and environment cost into considerations.
How much the consumers bear the tax burden is another central question in the public finance
literature. In the second chapter of my dissertation, we use a detailed transaction-level and show
that small car buyers benefit about 80% from the tax reduction. The substitutes buyers also enjoy
a lower price. In future work, I will evaluate the distribution effect using a structural approach. By




Figure 1.1: Tax Holidays
Note: This figure demonstrates how the tax holiday and subsidy program phased in and interact
with each other. Tax rate is 10% if there’s no policy. Policy event is labeled on Y axis and X axis
shows the timing of each policy.
[Source] Website of China’s Department of Finance
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Figure 1.2: Tax Rate for Different Cars
Note: This figure shows the effect tax rate for different group cars which mirrors figure 1. For
subsidized car we take the price as 80000 Yuan. The 3000 Yuan is equivalent to a 3.75% tax
deduction. The green line corresponds to the tax holiday and yellow lines corresponds to the
subsidy program.
[Source] Calculated by authors.
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Figure 1.3: Relationship between Gas Use Per 100KM and displacement level
[Source] Website of China’s Department of Industry and Commercial
25
Figure 1.4: Price distribution for small, medium and large cars
Note: Small:<=1.6L Medium:>1.6L<2.0L Large:>2.0L





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.3: Data Description
N Mean s.d Min Max
Monthly sales in a province (Sales) 4339845 38.9 112.6 1 8659
Eligibility 4339845 0.3 0.35 0 1
Engine size (liters) 4339845 1.79 0.48 0 3
Fuel inefficiency (liters/100 km) 4339845 7.9 1.6 2.7 14.78
Horsepower (kw) 4339845 92.5 28 26.5 252
Weight (kg) 4339845 1344.7 273.6 645 2690
Table 1.4: Baseline result
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DV(LnSale) Unsubsidized Cars Subsidized Cars
Medium or Cheaper
Large Cars
Tax Own -9.584*** -9.754*** -7.031*** -7.515***
(1.98) (2.02) (1.18) (1.22)
Tax compe1 5.834*** 5.963*** 5.203** 5.742** 3.064** 2.991**
(1.87) (1.89) (2.51) (2.62) (1.19) (1.22)
Tax compe2 4.740*** 4.793***
(1.70) (1.72)
|∆Tax|−1 9.524*** 9.666*** 5.015*** 5.196***
(1.53) (1.55) (1.01) (1.05)
|∆Tax|+1 -2.703* -2.486* 3.019*** 3.402*** -1.340** -1.276**
(1.51) (1.54) (1.03) (1.05) (0.59) (0.60)
Number of Observations 2792111 2551880 1335388 1213119 1925937 1755643
R square 0.825 0.83 0.839 0.841 0.814 0.816
Controls Fixed Effects, Linear Trends, Life Cycle, Gas, CCI
Including SH BJ TJ Y N Y N Y N
Product Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: This table uses full sample from 2005-2018, in even number columns we exclude data from cities with licences
restriction policies. ∆Tax−i in column (1) to (4) captures the impact of tax rate change in the anticipation and
lagging effect of treated cars’ own tax rate changes. ∆Tax−i in column (5) and (6) captures impact of tax rate change
in the anticipation and lagging effect of treated cars’ competitors’ tax rate changes. We control for model fixed effect,
province fixed effect and sample month fixed effect in all regression. Standard errors are clustered at model level. In
columns (2) (4) and (6) we exclude Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin and Hangzhou.
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Table 1.5: Baseline result
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DV(LnSale) Unsubsidized Cars subsidized Cars
Medium or Cheaper
Large Cars
Tax Own -9.630*** -9.805*** -7.350*** -7.860***
(1.98) (2.02) (1.18) (1.22)
Tax compe1 6.054*** 6.186*** 5.313** 5.866** 3.064** 2.991**
(1.87) (1.89) (2.51) (2.62) (1.19) (1.22)
Tax compe2 4.740*** 4.793***
(1.70) (1.72)
|∆Tax|−1 10.02*** 10.17*** 5.046*** 5.238***
(1.53) (1.55) (1.01) (1.05)
|∆Tax|−2 2.650* 2.660* -0.284 -0.246
(1.43) (1.44) (0.87) (0.91)
|∆Tax|+1 -2.288 -2.058 3.346*** 3.761*** -1.340** -1.276**
(1.51) (1.54) (1.03) (1.05) (0.59) (0.60)
|∆Tax|+2 3.791*** 3.943*** 4.532*** 4.994***
(1.42) (1.45) (1.03) (1.05)
Number of Observations 2792111 2551880 1335388 1213119 1925937 1755643
R square 0.825 0.83 0.839 0.841 0.814 0.816
Controls Fixed Effects, Linear Trends, Life Cycle, Gas, CCI
Including SH BJ TJ Y N Y N Y N
Product Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: This table uses full sample from 2005-2018, in even number columns we exclude data from cities with licences
restriction policies. ∆Tax−i in column (1) to (4) captures the impact of tax rate change in the anticipation and
lagging effect of treated cars’ own tax rate changes. ∆Tax−i in column (5) and (6) captures impact of tax rate change
in the anticipation and lagging effect of treated cars’ competitors’ tax rate changes. We control for model fixed effect,
province fixed effect and sample month fixed effect in all regression. Standard errors are clustered at model level. In
columns (2) (4) and (6) we exclude Shanghai, Beijing Tianjin and Hangzhou.
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Table 1.6: Without model fixed effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DV(LnSale) Unsubsidized Cars subsidized Cars
Medium or Cheaper
Large Cars
Tax Own -8.749*** -9.092*** -7.994*** -8.498***
(2.36) (2.38) (1.59) (1.61)
Tax compe1 5.917*** 6.245*** 2.018 2.623 2.646* 2.679*
(2.174) (2.184) (2.412) (2.493) (1.53) (2.18)
Tax compe2 2.739 2.597
(2.17) (1.54)
|∆Tax|−1 6.299*** 6.621*** 1.645 1.92
(1.72) (1.73) (1.22) (1.23)
|∆Tax|−2 0.276 0.414 -2.845** -2.753**
(1.56) (1.57) (1.11) (1.12)
|∆Tax|+1 -2.016 -1.741 2.096 2.609* -0.932 -0.847
(2.25) (2.28) (1.31) (1.34) (0.82) (0.83)
|∆Tax|+2 0.13 0.327 2.902** 3.445***
(2.14) (2.17) (1.29) (1.32)
Number of Observations 2792111 2551880 1335388 1213119 1925937 1755643
R square 0.656 0.656 0.672 0.671 0.621 0.618
Controls Fixed Effects, Linear Trends, Life Cycle, Gas, CCI
Including SH BJ TJ Y N Y N Y N
Product Fixed Effect N N N N N N
Note: This table uses full sample from 2005-2018, in even number columns we exclude data from cities with licences
restriction policies. ∆Tax−i in column (1) to (4) captures the impact of tax rate change in the anticipation and lagging
effect of treated cars’ own tax rate changes. ∆Tax−i in column (5) and (6) captures impact of tax rate change in the
anticipation and lagging effect of treated cars’ competitors’ tax rate changes. We control for province fixed effect and
sample month fixed effect in all regression. Standard errors are clustered at model level. In columns (2) (4) and (6) we
exclude Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin.
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Table 1.7: Robustness Check: Omitting cars in the middle
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DV(LnSale) Unsubsidized Cars subsidized Cars
Medium or Cheaper
Large Cars
Tax Own -7.897*** -8.020*** -7.906*** -8.455***
(2.134) (2.158) (1.192) (1.234)
Tax compe1 4.634** 4.756** 6.385** 6.977** 4.770** 4.763**
(2.081) (2.099) (2.619) (2.742) (1.956) (1.973)
Tax compe2 6.068*** 6.042***
(1.634) (1.669)
|∆Tax|−1 10.58*** 10.70*** 4.844*** 5.018***
(1.775) (1.792) (1.039) (1.070)
|∆Tax|−2 2.137 2.162 -0.481 -0.431
(1.625) (1.639) (0.901) (0.933)
|∆Tax|+1 -3.233** -2.913* 3.611*** 4.057*** -2.061*** -2.001***
(1.644) (1.672) (1.059) (1.086) (0.711) (0.721)
|∆Tax|+2 3.457** 3.703** 4.731*** 5.256***
(1.550) (1.582) (1.053) (1.078)
Number of Observations 2600755 2377618 1144032 1038857 1396659 1273242
R square 0.824 0.829 0.838 0.841 0.813 0.815
Controls Fixed Effects, Linear Trends, Life Cycle, Gas, CCI
Including SH BJ TJ Y N Y N Y N
Product Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: This table uses full sample from 2005-2018, in even number columns we exclude data from cities with licences
restriction policies. ∆Tax−i in column (1) to (4) captures the impact of tax rate change in the anticipation and
lagging effect of treated cars’ own tax rate changes. ∆Tax−i in column (5) and (6) captures impact of tax rate change
in the anticipation and lagging effect of treated cars’ competitors’ tax rate changes. We control for model fixed effect,
province fixed effect and sample month fixed effect in all regression. Standard errors are clustered at model level. In
columns (2) (4) and (6) we exclude Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin and Hangzhou.
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Table 1.8: Robustness Check: Weaker criteria for control group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DV(LnSale) Unsubsidized Cars subsidized Cars
Medium or Cheaper
Large Cars
Tax Own -7.889*** -8.009*** -7.870*** -8.417***
(2.121) (2.145) (1.191) (1.232)
Tax compe1 4.695** 4.820** 6.445** 7.043*** 1.971* 1.897
(2.070) (2.088) (2.607) (2.728) (1.178) (1.215)
Tax compe2 4.855*** 4.900***
(1.719) (1.739)
|∆Tax|−1 10.68*** 10.81*** 4.919*** 5.097***
(1.770) (1.787) (1.038) (1.069)
|∆Tax|−2 2.183 2.205 -0.419 -0.369
(1.620) (1.634) (0.900) (0.931)
|∆Tax|+1 -3.160* -2.831* 3.647*** 4.092*** -1.710*** -1.655***
(1.640) (1.668) (1.057) (1.083) (0.611) (0.618)
|∆Tax|+2 3.471** 3.722** 4.712*** 5.235***
(1.547) (1.580) (1.051) (1.076)
Number of Observations 2608027 2384386 1151304 1045625 1925937 1755643
R-sq 0.824 0.829 0.838 0.840 0.814 0.816
Controls Fixed Effects, Linear Trends, Life Cycle, Gas, CCI
Including SH BJ TJ Y N Y N Y N
Product Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: This table uses full sample from 2005-2018, in even number columns we exclude data from cities with licences
restriction policies. ∆Tax−i in column (1) to (4) captures the impact of tax rate change in the anticipation and
lagging effect of treated cars’ own tax rate changes. ∆Tax−i in column (5) and (6) captures impact of tax rate change
in the anticipation and lagging effect of treated cars’ competitors’ tax rate changes. We control for model fixed effect,
province fixed effect and sample month fixed effect in all regression. Standard errors are clustered at model level. In
columns (2) (4) and (6) we exclude Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin and Hangzhou.
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Table 1.9: Robustness Check: Stricter criteria for control group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DV(LnSale) Unsubsidized Cars subsidized Cars
Medium or Cheaper
Large Cars
Tax Own -9.786*** -10.02*** -7.681*** -8.222***
(2.107) (2.136) (1.186) (1.229)
Tax compe1 5.962*** 6.176*** 5.484** 6.019** 2.413** 2.381**
(1.950) (1.964) (2.601) (2.723) (1.153) (1.188)
Tax compe2 4.878*** 4.931***
(1.717) (1.737)
|∆Tax|−1 10.41*** 10.58*** 5.111*** 5.262***
(1.535) (1.544) (1.025) (1.057)
|∆Tax|−2 2.312 2.393* -0.510 -0.482
(1.431) (1.438) (0.891) (0.924)
|∆Tax|+1 -2.077 -1.769 3.748*** 4.170*** -1.714*** -1.654***
(1.601) (1.629) (1.041) (1.066) (0.614) (0.622)
|∆Tax|+2 4.445*** 4.710*** 4.918*** 5.411***
(1.451) (1.483) (1.028) (1.054)
Number of Observations 2687432 2456554 1230709 1117793 1925937 1755643
R-sq 0.825 0.830 0.839 0.841 0.814 0.816
Controls Fixed Effects, Linear Trends, Life Cycle, Gas, CCI
Including SH BJ TJ Y N Y N Y N
Product Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: This table uses full sample from 2005-2018, in even number columns we exclude data from cities with licences
restriction policies. ∆Tax−i in column (1) to (4) captures the impact of tax rate change in the anticipation and
lagging effect of treated cars’ own tax rate changes. ∆Tax−i in column (5) and (6) captures impact of tax rate change
in the anticipation and lagging effect of treated cars’ competitors’ tax rate changes. We control for model fixed effect,
province fixed effect and sample month fixed effect in all regression. Standard errors are clustered at model level. In




















































































































































































































































































Tax Incidence on Substitutes: Evidence from China’s
Car Market
2.1 Introduction
One of the most fundamental research question in public finance literature is who bears the burden
of taxes. The pass-through of indirect taxation is key to evaluate tax policy’s welfare implication
and how government can use tax tools to shape consumer behavior. The discussion of tax incidence
in public finance literature has been focused a lot on the single product market. This simplification
ignores the potential impact of the tax rate’s change on its close substitute’s price and the policies
can not be precisely evaluated. For instance, the traditional model predicts that sellers will change
their price when competitors’ after-tax price changes. But little evidence has been provided of the
cross-product pass-through of taxation and how it interacts with market structure empirically.
A large body of literature has studied how the tax change the final price consumers for the tar-
geted item under single product partial equilibrium framework. However, little is known about the
impact of one products’ tax rate change on related products. Weyl and Fabinger [2013] extends
the stand tax incidence analysis to more general imperfect competition settings. The theoretical
perdition is ambiguous when we consider the multiproduct firms. As shown by some recent de-
velopment of the cost pass-though studies Armstrong and Vickers [2018]. More the 60% firms are
multiproduct firms in the U.S. and it is important to take the cross product effect into consideration
when determining tax incidence. Hotelling [1932] on Edgeworth Taxation Paradox states that for
multiproduct firms, imposing a tax on one product could possibly decrease the price for both prod-
ucts. Their work has motivated economists to think deeper about how the shape of demand curves
and market structure characterize who bears the burden of taxation.
This paper explores a tax cut in the Chinese car market for small-engine cars. We first show
that a five percentage point tax cut decreases the final price by approximately four percentage
points. More importantly, we provide evidence on how tax rate change affects the price of close
substitutes using administrative data. We propose a simple model to discuss what characterizes the
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incidence of a substitute. Our paper is the first empirical paper that provides a causal estimate of
tax incidence under a multiproduct firm setting. Specifically, we study a tax cut for cars with an
engine size smaller than 1.6 liters in the car market in China, car manufactures produce both small
and large cars, and their pricing strategy must take cannibalization into account when setting its
markups. Our results have broader implications and can be applied to more general settings when
tax policies are targeted on certain products such as Soda taxes based on sugar per liter, cigarette
taxes based on E-cigarette or not, the tariff on certain products and housing transaction taxes based
on size of the house.
The empirical work on identifying pass-through faces several challenges: First we need to con-
struct a substitutable group and the control group. Most sales tax changes apply to all products and
it is often hard to find a control group from the same market; Second is the lack of administrative
transaction price data. Our paper studies a policy change based on car engine size and it allows to
separate cars into control and substitutable groups and we have information on each car’s detailed
daily transaction price.
We study a car sales tax holiday for vehicles with a displacement level smaller than 1.6L in
China and estimate the incidence of tax-exempt cars and close substitutes. In October 2015, car
acquisition tax was halved from 10 to 5 percent on small cars with engine size less than 1.6 liters
to stimulate the market and spur clean cars. The tax was then raised to 7.5 percent in January 2017
and returned to the original 10 percent in January 2018. The beginning of the tax holiday is a
surprise to the market, and it was only announced two days before implementation. And the end
of the holiday is fully anticipated.
In order to identify the control and the substitutable group, we use engine size and price to
separate all passenger cars into three groups. The tax exempted small cars whose engine size
is smaller than 1.6L; substitutable group: the medium cars whose engine size is between 1.6L
and 2.0L and whose price is close to the smaller cars or cars whose engine size is above 2.0L
but with a price even closer to the small cars market; control group: the unaffected cars whose
engine size is above 2.0L and whose price is high or engine size slightly above 1.6L but expensive
enough. Using transaction-level administrative data from a major city in China and a difference
in difference estimation strategy. We study how smaller car’s tax rate change affects its sales and
pre-tax price and how it affects the medium cars’ sales and pre-tax price.
Our analysis yields several findings: First if we compare the pre-tax price within each product
in the DID estimation, we find that consumers benefit approximately 80% of the tax cut. This
is consistent with the large sales response of small car sales. Second, we find clear evidence on
the incidence of medium cars: the tax cut for small cars decreased the sales for medium cars
and lowered its pre-tax sales price. More interestingly, for each firm, we calculate the share of
mall cars and we find among the firms with more sales from small cars, their medium cars price
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will decrease less. The intuition is if firms benefit more from the small car’s tax cut they have
less incentive to lower medium car price to avoid cannibalization. We also construct a measure
of ”distance between products” using the gap of average transaction price to capture how likely
medium car consumers switch to smaller cars because of the tax cut. We find that the pass-through
on substitutes becomes larger when the substitutes are more different from small cars.
We provide a simple model to rationalize our findings. In our setting, the consumers first
choose a brand and then decide the size of the car. A nested logit model is consistent with the
two-step car purchase decision. The supply-side follows standard oligopolistic multiproduct as-
sumption. We have two firms that produce both small and large cars. In contrast to competitive
firms, an oligopolistic multiproduct firm must take cannibalization into account, both when setting
its markups and when deciding which products to offer. We propose a multiproduct oligopoly
model that firms maximize the joint profit from both small and medium cars. When firms set price
they need to balance the industry level shock from the tax changes and the cannibalization effect.
In the last section, we will discuss tax incidence on substitutes under different model assumptions.
Our paper builds on and contributes to two main literature. First we provide new causal esti-
mates of tax incidence from the world largest car market. Researchers have made huge progress on
this topic under partial equilibrium framework [Besley and Rosen, 1999b, Carbonnier, 2007]. Kaul
et al. [2016] studies the incidence of cash for clunkers program in Germany. We shed light to this
literature by showing clear evidence that tax rate change also affect the price of close substitutes.
Second, we also speak to IO and marketing literature on cost path through. A tax change has
similar implications on firm cost. In particular, our paper discusses the within-firm competition
effect.The most closely related work is [Agrawal and Hoyt, 2019]. Their paper provides an nice
angle in perfectly competition market when gen general equilibrium effect matters for incidence
and focus more on the possibility of over shifting. While our paper focuses on estimating the
impact on substitutes per se and we study the imperfect competition market conditions. Moorthy
[2005] provides a general formulation of the channel pass-through problem focusing on brand and
retailer differences. Related to findings in this paper Besanko et al. [2005] first investigate the
determinants of cross product pass-through, they find that ”trade promotions on large brands are
less likely than small brands to generate positive cross-brand pass-through, i.e., induce the retailer
to reduce the retail price of competing smaller products.”
One concern about our main result is driven by tax evasion. When the tax rate for a small car is
lower, dealers have less incentive to report a lower price to the tax authority, and thus we observe a
higher pre-tax price. We use buyers’ self-reported price scrapped from Qichezhijia; the most well-
known national-wide car funs forum in China, In the forum the buyers self-report the transaction
price, month and city of purchase as well as the trim of the car. They have no incentive to report a
manipulated price due to tax evasion. We use the self-reported price to test The additional evidence
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comes from self reported price from a forum on cars where users discuss the price and quality of
the car. The self reported price has no incentive to consider tax evasion. However, we are also
aware that this is a highly selective sample. If the selection effect does not change due to the
tax rate change we can trust more. We find that the empirical results from tax return data and
self-reported data are quite similar and conclude that the increase of pre-tax price is not primarily
driven by increased tax compliance due to lower tax rate.
We need to be careful when interpreting our difference-in-Differences estimator, it captures
the total effect of the tax rate change on price. Note that for small cars this includes both the
direct effect of tax rates change and indirect effect from cross price effect of the medium car price
changes. We do not decompose the direct and indirect effect in this paper.
The scope of this paper is to study the short run effect tax rate change. We are interested
in the price adjustment in equilibrium but not the product portfolio firms are offering. Different
from Sallee [2011] where he looks at the data around the tax rate when the tax holidays expires.
The research design requires him to address the the selection effect because more sophisticated
consumers will forward their their purchase.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we briefly describe the
Chinese passenger car market and the policy details; in section three we introduce our data and
construction of the control group; next we show our empirical strategy and present results in
detail; in section five we propose a simple model to rationalize our findings; finally, we conclude
and offer suggestions for future research.
2.2 Institutional Background and Policy in China
2.2.1 Market Size and Structure
China’s auto market grows rapidly and since 2009, it has been the largest global vehicle market,
with yearly sales of passenger cars exceeding ten million. Please refer to my first chapter for more
description of the market. Due to the support of local government, the competition of China’s car
market is fierce. The market share of the top 10 firms was over 90% in early 2000 but was reduced
to 70% in 2010. In 2018 about 108 firms are active in the market.
For the city I am studying, the population is more than ten million. The city does not impose
any licence registration restriction policies, congestion fee or other car purchase restrictions during
the period of our study. Driven restriction policies based on the last number of licence plate is
applied as in many other big cities in China. We do not have access to the information on licence
plate.
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2.2.2 Compliance of Car Acquisition Tax
The policy effect also depends on the compliance of the acquisition tax. The acquisition tax is
enforced by the traffic police which is part of China’s security system. The owner can’t get the
license plate from traffic police unless s/he remits the tax. The whole process certificated by a
chain a paper work from tax invoice to license plate. The potential corruption is easily detected if
any.
There are some anecdotal evidence that among very expensive cars buyers and dealers collude
and reported a lower price to IRS to evade the transaction tax. We will discuss the potential threat
to our main results later.
2.2.3 Car Acquisition Tax and the Tax Holiday
The acquisition tax is only levied on first-time purchase car and based on the pre-value added tax
price at a 10% rate. On Sep 30th, 2015 the official announcement came out saying from Oct 1st to
December 31th, 2016 for vehicles with displacement level smaller than 1.6L acquisition tax rate
will be 5%. Then at the end of the year 2016, the central government compromised with the car
producer and extended the holiday for another year with a higher rate at 7.5%. Starting from Jan
1st 2018 the tax rate goes back to its original level at 10 percent. The beginning of the holiday is
a surprise to the market, but the expiration is fully anticipated. One thing worth noting about the
design of the threshold based tax policy is very common in commodity taxes and also well studied
in the car market, see Gillitzer et al. [2017] and Sallee and Slemrod [2010].
2.3 Data and construction of control group
2.3.1 Daily transaction level data
We use transaction level data from a major city in China from 2015 to 2017 in this paper. The
transaction record is obtained from the valued-added tax collection system. The sellers need to
report the date of transaction, pre-tax price and the detailed information of each car to the local
IRS. We know the model of the car and can identify the eligibility of tax holiday. We also have
the information on which firm produced the car and the de-identified dealers’ ID.Model is an
important information here, unlike the U.S., in China auto market there’s very little room for
optionsBarwick et al. [2017]. We can treat cars with the same model as the same car. We take
advantage of this setting to have a clear estimation of pass through of the tax by comparing the
price change within the same product.
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2.3.2 Cash subsidy program
Another important fiscal policy implemented during the sample period in this paper is the cash
subsidy program in which eligible cars will get a 3,000 CNY cash subsidy. Unfortunately we
can not compare the effect tax rate change and subsidy because we do not know exactly whether
the transaction price is subsidy inclusive or not. Some dealers deduct the the price before the
transaction and some will issue a check after the car is sold. To address the potential threat of the
cash subsidy program we drop the subsidized car and the results does not change much compared
with our main results.
2.3.3 Constructing Control Group
The policy designs allow us to employ the difference-in-differences strategy to estimate the causal
impact of the policies. Before showing the graphical and estimation result, we discuss how we
construct the control and substitutable groups. We use the displacement level, and market retail
price to construct small cars’ counterfactual. A valid control group should not be affected by the
tax holiday and has a similar growth rate with the small cars absent from the policy. The natural
criterion is engine size, given the policy. People care about displacement level because it is one
of the most important parts of a car that determines car performance, such as fuel consumption
and horsepower. In Figure 2.8, we plot the correlation between engine size and gas consumption
per 100 kilometers (GPK). First, we observe a positive correlation between engine size and GPK;
note that the variance conditional on engine size is also large. This motivates us to utilize more
information to construct the control group. We need to know the top considerations for consumers
and use them to separate cars into different markets. A tax policy targeted on some cars from
the low-end market should not affect the high-end market. We went to the most popular phone
app in China “Dongchedi” (meaning Car Expert in Chinese) and took a screenshot as shown in
Figure A.5. When a consumer indicates that he or she is interested in buying a new car, the system
asks for the preference for brand first then immediately requests desired price range and half of
their space to collect this information. This fact indicates that the most important factor for market
segmentation is price. Our conversations with sales people at dealership confirms this argument. In
addition to engine size, we use price to construct the control group and substitutable group. Figure
?? shows the price distribution of three groups of cars with the same scale on the X-axis (Price).
All cars above 1.6L are not directly affected by the policy. From Figure 2.8 and our conversations
with car dealers, we notice that a watershed in China’s auto market is 2.0L, and cars above 2.0L
are generally considered to be more comfortable and luxurious. We call cars between 1.6L and
2.0L (including 2.0L) medium cars and those above 2.0L larger cars.
Same as chapter one, the first observation is that most of the smaller cars (Up-left) are cheaper
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than 200,000 Yuan (28,000 USD), but larger cars (Down-left) are more expensive in general, but
the overlap in price is still not negligible. We also observe a bimodal distribution for the medium
cars, competing with both small and larger cars. Again, this fact justifies the importance of using
price information to further classify cars into different markets. We use 1) cars that are above 2.0L
and more expensive than 200,000 Yuan or 2) cars above 1.6L and more expensive than 250,000
Yuan as a control group. Furthermore, we treat the large cars with a price lower than 200,000 Yuan
and medium cars with a price lower than 250,000 Yuan as substitutable cars. In the robustness
check part, we drop some very close models to the cutoffs and use stricter or weaker criteria for
constructing control groups. Our main result does not change much.
Low-end market
Treated cars: small carsSubstitutable car: median or large cars that are also cheaper
High-end market: Control Group: median or large cars that are expensive
2.4 Graphical Evidence
2.4.1 Main Effect on Prices
To provide the visual evidence of how tax change price we need to construct a price index using the
transaction level data. We use the Laspeyres Price Index in our context. The idea is to compare the
price change for the same set of product. We first restrict our sample on cars that have sales record
in each week around the date of tax rate change (eight weeks before and after the tax rate change).
We use the first four weeks’ sales as the weight of the Laspeyres Price Index and construct the
price index. This allows us to identity the overall price level change just from the price change
from each product, excluding the product choice changes. From the graphs we can see that before
the tax rate change, there is no difference for the three price index. And right after the tax rate
decreased from 10% to 5%, the small car’s pre-tax price increased by a very small amount hence
most of the benefit of the tax cut is goes to the consumers. We find this pattern both in the short run
and long run. Price of substitutable cars also increased a little. While when the tax rate increased,
the pretax price of small cars decreased gradually and eventually the benefit was totally offset
within six months. And we don’t find evidence on price change of the medium cars.
We choose the six months window in our main result because one one hand we need a long
enough period to allow for firm adjust their prices and on the other hand we need to make sure
no other marketing strategy that will affect different cars differently. In the car market, dealers
need to accomplish the year quota set by firms and the promotion strategies are different before
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and after 1st January; in the china’s car market, Chinese Lunar year is an important factor for
the business cycle. In the robustness check section we show the six months and also provide the
estimation results using four months and two months window.
Insert Figure 2.1 and 2.5
2.4.2 Placebo Test
In Figure 2.5 we use data in 2014 and the same method to test if the result is driven by the national
holiday (from Oct 1st to 7th) effects. We do not observe any similar pattern as in Figure 2.1.
2.4.3 Effect on Quantity
We also look at the total impact of the policy on car sales. The quantity response is consistent with
the price behaviour. Figure 2.4 shows before October 1st 2015 the weekly sales for all groups are
very stable and parallel. We observe a significant drop right after the tax rate changed. This is
driven by the one week long National Day holiday when most people do not go to work and only
few dealers still sell cars.
The data we use in this paper only cover one city and to better understand the implications
of the stimulus impact we need to use national level sales data. In my first dissertation chapter,
Wang (2020) estimates sales response of the tax policies in last decade in China using national car
registration data.
Insert Figure 2.4
2.5 Identification Strategy and Empirical Results
To establish the causal effect of the policy we employ the difference-in-differences estimation
strategy and use cars in high-end market as the counterfactual of treated and substitutable cars. In
the robustness check section, we will use a different criterion for treated and substitutable cars.
We model car sales and price as a function of its own tax rate and its substitute’s tax rate, more
specifically we use the following specification:
Ln(Pit) = β0 + β1Ln(TaxOwnit) + αi + αt + εit (2.1)
Ln(Pit) = β0 + β1Ln(TaxCompeit) + αi + αt + εit (2.2)
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The outcome variable Ln(Priceit) is the natural logarithm of model i cars’ sales price and sales
in month t. αi and αt are the model and date-of-sample fixed effects. Controlling for the model
fixed effect is crucial for our identification. By controlling for model fixed effect we focus on the
variation within models. TaxOwnit is the tax rate for cars of model i in date t. TaxCompeit is
the competitors’ tax rate. We run two sets of separate regressions for (1) and (2) to identify the
own and cross price pass-through. We also control for effect of gas price and group specific trend.
The estimates from Table 2.1 and 2.2 are the main parameters of interests this paper. The results
are robust under different model specifications and different ways of standard error clustering. Fol-
lowing the standard literature on tax incidence calculation. Our result shows small car consumers
bear more the 80% of the sales tax incidence.
Insert Table 2.1 and 2.2
In order to detect any anticipation effect and test the parallel trend before policy we also
perform a event-study estimation. The week before tax change is set as baseline. As we see in
Figure 2.2 and 2.3 the relative price did not change much before policy after we partial out the
common shocks.
Insert Figure 2.2 and 2.3
On concern of the pre-tax price change of small car is that this might be driven by evasion
response. We present our second evidence coming from self-reported price from a forum on cars
where users discuss the price, quality and more details about the experience of the car. Only
verified buyer who submit a certificate of car purchase can share their comments. The self reported
price is more consistent with the real transaction price. But We are also aware that this is a highly
selective sample. If the selection effect does not change due to the tax rate change we should not
worry much about it. In Table 2.3 we replicate our main results using the self-reported prices. The
coefficients do not change much in magnitude. Note here for the self-reported we only know the
month of transaction and the car type information is at trim level which is higher than the IRS
data. We control for city fixed effects in these two regressions.
Insert Table 2.3
2.5.1 Role of Cannibalization
To study the role of cannibalization on cross-product pass-through, we show how medium
car share affect the price change of medium car. We add the interaction term of tax rate and
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medium car share into the baseline specification in Table 2.4. We also implement an alternative
specification in which we create a set of dummy variable for medium car share in Figure 2.6. The
dummy variable takes value of one if a firms medium car share belongs the first, second, third or
fourth quantile. Both estimation results suggest that if the firm has more share of medium car, its
medium car price response more to the competitors’ cost shock.
Insert Table 2.4 and Figure 2.6
2.6 The Model for Multiproduct Firms
The classical IO models of cost pass-through adopt the linear demand curves to derive the analyt-
ical solutions. As Amir et al. [2017] noted the only way to obtain a micro-founded linear demand
utility function that is to define the utility function quadratic in the n consumption goods and quasi-
linear in the numeraire. One implication of the linear demand system is cross product pass-through
is zero under constant marginal cost and symmetric multi-product firms assumptions [Friberg and
Romahn, 2018].
The goal of the theoretical model part of this paper is to discuss under what conditions the
cross product tax incidence is negative and how cannibalization effect involves in the model. We
first adopt a logit demand function because it is a widely used discrete choice models and more
realistic in the car market in section 7.1 and then change the symmetric firm assumption in 7.2.
Both approaches generate consistent theoretical predictions that is consistent with our empirical
findings.
2.6.1 Nest Logit Demand and Cross Product Pass-through
In reality most firms offer a wide range of product and they compete with each other as well as the
competition with other firms. And this makes a commodity tax based on product characteristics
more complicated. In a multi-product setting, when firms set price they need to balance the industry
level shock from the tax changes and the cannibalization effect. In a extreme case, if a firm only
sells medium cars they it needs to lower price a lot to compete with the low tax small cars. But if
the firm produce both and its within firm cross price elasticity is high then it has less incentives to
lower medium cars’ price since the profit margin of small cars are higher.1
Consumers chose firm first then they decide to buy a small or medium car stage. That is,
Qij = NSiSij for i = 1, 2 and j = M,S where N is the size of the market, Q2S and Q2M are the
1The car sales tax is an ad valorem tax in practice, to have closed form solutions we start with unit tax in the
illustrative models.
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sales of small and medium car of Firm 2, Q1S is the sales of small cars of Firm 1 and it does not
produce medium cars. Here 1 and 2 indicate whether the firm produces one or two types of cars.
Sij is product j′ s share within firm i, and Si is firm i′ s share. In the nested-logit specification,
Sij =
exp (αij − pij) /µb∑2






where Ri = µb ln
[∑2
k=1 exp (αik − pik) /µb
]
for i = S,M µr ≥ µb are the parameters to capture
for firm choice and cartype choice, respectively, and the αij are parameters reflecting the utility of
the firm-cartype combination ij. generated.
The nice feature of the logit demand structure allows us to write down the pricing strategy in an
easier way, for each product at each firm the profit margin should equalize [Anderson and de Palma,
1992]. This result is an important technical reason for us to choose the nested logit struture:
pij − (ti + c) = µr1−Si for i = 1, 2, j = S,M
Note that we focus on the marginal cost of small car’s tax rate change impact on medium cars’








This model also predicts the own pass-through, overall we predict own pass-through is positive
but medium car share have opposite effects. For firm 2, the pass-through is higher than 100% and
for Firm Single the pass-through is lower than 100%. We have
dP2S
dts





(S2M) and dP1Sdts = 1-
1
|∆|(S2M)
This paper’s focus is on the cross product impact of a tax rate changes. However, our simple
model also have predictions on the own-price effect.
2.6.2 Two Asymmetric Firms, Two Products
In this section we modify the assumptions in firm side. We consider a simple model where firm 1
is a single product firm and only produces small cars. Firm 2 is a multi-product firm and produces
two products, small and medium cars. We assume a large enough upgrading cost for firm one such
that it will not choose to produce medium car.






s . Firm 1 pro-




s Firm 1 only produce one product, small cars; Firm 2
2where ∆=1 + (S1S2 ) + (
S1
S2
)2 and this is greater than 1.
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m and cm cs to denote
medium and small car prices and costs. q2m and q
2
s are firm 2’s production for medium and small
cars. q1s is firm 1’s production for small car. The three cars compete with each other. The inverse
demand curves are Pm= αm-βmqm+γqs and Ps= αs-βsqs+γqm.
Firms choose quantity and compete with each other. We have three FOCs. If we take the
differentiation of the system and rearrange we can show all the partial effect of the sales tax. We




> 0. When the firms are asymmetric, we show that if
tax rate of small car decrease, the price of medium cars will decrease as a result.
More importantly we study how this effect change with the share of medium car sales of firm
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> 0. Together with dpm
dts
> 0 this implies when small car tax
decreases price of medium car will decrease, and for firms with more sales from small car, the








and when γ and β change they change share of small and medium cars
and the incidence.
2.7 Conclusion
Tax incidence studies are central to public finance literature, however, almost no attention has been
paid to the cross-product price impact and how it interacts with market condition and demand
structure. This paper fills the gap in literature by exploring a tax rate change in China’s car market
that lowers the tax rate from 10% to 5% for cars with small engines. Using transaction-level tax
administrative data we show that consumer price for small cars drops by approximately 4.2% and
their competitors’ price also dropped by 0.6%.
Next we consider how tax change close substitute’s price in the multiproduct firm setting. The
small car tax rate decrease first lowers the demand for competing cars and firms have pressure to
charge a lower price for medium cars. They response differently based on how easy a medium
sized car is substituted by a small car and how much they rely on medium car sales. Firms will
respond more if they care less about the market stealing effect. We build a simple model to study
the pass-through on close substitutes in a multi-product oligopoly world where firms need to take
cannibalization effect into consideration when they respond to a tax change on some of their prod-
uct. Our analysis shows the market share of the target product matters for the incidence of its
3let δ ≡ dpmdts .Then we write
q2m
q2s





- 2) + βm/δ - 3 αm)/(3*(αm*δ + βm). Solving for this we derive the relationship between dpmdts and share of medium






More than 60% firms (U.S. data in 2014) are multiple firms and tax policies are often based
on product characteristics which could generate spillover effect on close substitutes provided by
the same firm. Our paper provide the first evidence on this topic and it could be applied to more
general settings when tax policies are targeted on certain products such as Soda taxes based on
sugar per liter, cigarette taxes based on E-cigarette or not, tariff on certain product and housing
transaction taxes based on size of the house. Our findings have more broad implications.
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Figures
Figure 2.1: Incidence on small and substitutes
Note: In this figure we show the weekly Paasche Index of small cars, substitutable cars and control
group. The red line indicates the week of tax rate cut.
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Figure 2.2: Event Study on Small Car Price
Note: In this figure we show the small car pre-tax price change relative to control group after the
tax cut. The dashed line indicates the week of tax rate cut.
Figure 2.3: Event Study on Substitutable Car Price
Note: In this figure we show the substitutable car pre-tax price change relative to control group
after the tax cut. The dashed line indicates the week of tax rate cut.
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Figure 2.4: Impact on sales
Note: In this figure we show the weekly sales of small cars, substitutable cars and control group.
The red line indicates the week of tax rate cut. We first take natural logarithm of the weekly sales
for each group and then normalize the date using the average number of the first four weeks in the
sample period of our study.
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Figure 2.5: Placebo test: Price change around Oct 1st 2014
Note: In this figure we show the weekly Paasche Index of small cars, substitutable cars and control
group. The red line indicates the week of one year before the tax rate cut.
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Figure 2.6: Small car share matters for cross price pass-through
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Figure 2.7: Search Index for Car Acquisition Tax Holiday
[Source] Baidu Search Engine
Figure 2.8: Relationship between fuel efficiency and displacement level




Table 2.1: Small Car Price Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(price)
ln(Taxrate+ 1) -0.138*** -0.138*** -0.133*** -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.158***
(0.0139) (0.0242) (0.0400) (0.0162) (0.0249) (0.0372)
Product and date
of sample FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Group specific trend N Y N Y N Y
Window Three Months Three Months Three Months Two Months Two Months Two Months
N 211689 211689 211689 164134 164134 164134
R-sq 0.990 0.990 1.000 0.990 0.990 1.000
Note: This table uses car transaction record from July 2015 to December 2015, in even number
columns we control for the group specific time trend. We control for product and date of sample
fixed effect in all regression. Standard errors are clustered at model level. In columns (1)-(3) we
use date three months before and after the tax cut, in columns (4)-(6) we use date two months
before and after the tax cut.
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Table 2.2: Average Effect on Close Substitutes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(price)
ln(taxrate+1) 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.0909* 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.0944**
(0.0164) (0.0287) (0.0466) (0.0192) (0.0301) (0.0433)
Product and date
of sample FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Group specific trend N N Y N N Y
sd cluster Robust Product Product Robust Product Product
Window Three Months Three Months Three Months Two Months Two Months Two Months
N 79822 79822 79822 63607 63607 63607
R-sq 0.985 0.985 1.000 0.985 0.985 1.000
Note: This table uses car transaction record from July 2015 to December 2015, in even number
columns we control for the group specific time trend. We control for product and date of sample
fixed effect in all regression. Standard errors are clustered at model level. In columns (1)-(3) we
use date three months before and after the tax cut, in columns (4)-(6) we use date two months
before and after the tax cut.
Table 2.3: Tax incidence estimation using self-reported price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Small V.S. Control Substitutable V.S. Control
lntax -0.155*** -0.155*** -0.122*** 0.177*** 0.177*** 0.185***
(0.0253) (0.0415) (0.0380) (0.0271) (0.0584) (0.0582)
N 30552 30552 27177 33904 33904 30522
Window Three Months Three Months Two Months Three Months Three Months Two Months
S.E. Cluster Robust Model Model Robust Model Model
R-sq 0.993 0.993 0.992 0.986 0.986 0.985
Note: This table uses self-reported car price from July 2015 to December 2015, in even number
columns we control for the group specific time trend. We control for product and date of sample
fixed effect in all regression. Standard errors are clustered at model level. In columns (1)-(3) we
use date three months before and after the tax cut, in columns (4)-(6) we use date two months
before and after the tax cut.
65
Table 2.4: Share of small cars by firms matters for the incidence on substitutes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(price)
ln(tax+1) 0.242*** 0.242*** 0.147*** 0.172*** 0.172*** 0.141***
(0.0254) (0.0429) (0.0555) (0.0291) (0.0441) (0.0540)
ln(tax+1)*share small -0.153*** -0.153*** -0.152*** -0.109*** -0.109* -0.109*
(0.0341) (0.0552) (0.0552) (0.0394) (0.0587) (0.0588)
Product and date
of sample FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Group specific trend N N Y N N Y
se cluster Robust Product Product Robust Product Product
Window Three Months Three Months Three Months Two Months Two Months Two Months
N 73166 73166 73166 58616 58616 58616
R-sq 0.985 0.985 1.000 0.985 0.985 1.000
Note: This table uses car transaction record from July 2015 to December 2015, in even number
columns we control for the group specific time trend. We control for product and date of sample
fixed effect in all regression. Standard errors are clustered at model level. In columns (1)-(3) we
use date three months before and after the tax cut, in columns (4)-(6) we use date two months
before and after the tax cut.
Table 2.5: Share of small cars by firms matters for the incidence on small cars
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(price)
ln(tax+1) 0.560*** 0.560*** 0.534*** 0.523*** 0.542*** 0.261***
(0.0459) (0.0861) (0.0940) (0.106) (0.0939) (0.0952)
ln(tax+1)*share small -0.816*** -0.816*** -0.816*** -0.822*** -0.823*** -0.508***
(0.0517) (0.101) (0.101) (0.124) (0.100) (0.102)
Product and date
of sample FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Group specific trend N N Y N N Y
se cluster Robust Product Product Robust Product Product
Window Three Months Three Months Three Months Two Months Two Months Two Months
N 211689 211689 211689 164134 164134 164134
R-sq 0.985 0.985 1.000 0.985 0.985 1.000
Note: This table uses car transaction record from July 2015 to December 2015, in even number
columns we control for the group specific time trend. We control for product and date of sample
fixed effect in all regression. Standard errors are clustered at model level. In columns (1)-(3) we
use date three months before and after the tax cut, in columns (4)-(6) we use date two months
before and after the tax cut.
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CHAPTER 3
The Impact of Corporate Taxes on Firm Innovation:
Evidence from the Corporate Tax Collection Reform
in China
3.1 Introduction
Innovation has been increasingly recognized as the main engine for economic growth [Solow,
1957, Romer, 1990, Grossman and Helpman, 1991, Aghion and Howitt, 2014]. Policy makers in
both developed and developing countries have started to use tax incentives to encourage investment
in innovation. But we know very little about the impact of such policies on firm innovation and
the underlying mechanisms. Theoretically, taxes can have either positive or negative impacts on
firm innovation. On the one hand, when RD expenditure is not fully tax deductible, lower corpo-
rate tax may lead to lower user cost of RD and a higher optimal level of innovation. Moreover,
lower taxes can increase the after-tax profit of firms, so that they have better capacity to invest in
new technologies or products; moreover, lower taxes may reduce resources that firms spend on tax
avoidance, such as costs of bribing tax officers, which can be instead used on innovation activities.
On the other hand, lower taxes may also have a negative impact on innovation because they de-
crease government revenue, and in turn may reduce government spending on public goods such as
research, education, and infrastructure. As a result, whether providing tax incentives can improve
firm innovation is ambiguous. This paper investigates the impact of taxes on firm innovation using
a natural experiment in China. In November 2001, China implemented a tax collection reform
on all manufacturing firms established on or after January 2002, which switched the collection of
corporate income taxes from the local tax bureau to the state tax bureau. Because of differences
in management and incentives of those two types of tax bureaus, the reform changed the enforce-
ment of tax collection, resulting in a reduction of corporate income tax rates by almost 10% among
treated firms. Since firms registered before 2002 were not affected by the reform, the policy change
created exogenous variations in the tax rate among similar firms established before or after 2002.
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We can thus apply a regression discontinuity design (RD) and use the generated variation in the tax
rate to identify the impact of taxes on firm innovation. To test the impact of taxes on innovation,
we combine a comprehensive dataset of all medium and large enterprises in China between 1998
and 2007 with patent data from the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) including all patents
applied in China by the year 2014. We use the data to measure three dimensions of innovation
activities: input (RD expenditure and skilled labor ratio), output (number of patent application),
and quality (type and characteristics of patent application). The key assumption of the RD anal-
ysis is that firm cohort should have a significant impact on corporate tax rate; however, all other
unobserved determinants of firm innovation are not correlated with firm cohort. We provide three
pieces of evidence to validate the estimation strategy. First, the reform did significantly reduce
the tax rate: the tax rate is almost 10% lower among firms established after 2002 compared with
those registered before 2002. Second, there’s no significant difference in firm entry around 2002,
suggesting that the reform was a surprise to firms and they did not selectively postpone the regis-
tration date. Third, we don’t see significantly higher firm re-registration after 2002. Our analysis
yields several interesting results. First, we show a strong and robust causal relationship between
tax rate and firm innovation: decreasing the tax rate by one standard deviation (0.01) increases
the average number of patent application by a significant 5.7%. The reform also stimulated RD
expenditures and increased the skilled-labor ratio. Second, the impact of the reform on patenting
mainly comes from its effect on invention and utility patents, suggesting that the improvement in
innovation outcomes is not merely driven by the low-quality design patents. Third, we show that a
low tax rate can stimulate firm’s innovation by alleviating financial constraints and by reallocating
resources from tax avoidance activities. Our work builds on and contributes to three main litera-
tures. First, this paper sheds light on the impact of taxes on firm decision-making and economic
growth. Existing research studied the influence of tax policies on economic growth [Romer and
Romer, 2010, Barro and Redlick, 2011], firm investment [Hines and Rice, 1994, Cummins and
Hubbard, 1996, Djankov and Shleifer, 2011, Mertens and Ravn, 2012, Zwick and Mahon, 2017,
Chen et al., 2021], corporate financial policy [Auerbach, 2002], entrepreneurial risk-taking [Cullen
and Gordon, 2007, Haufler and Persson, 2014] and location decisions [Moretti and Wilson, 2017].
However, the impact of taxes on firm innovation is not well explored. Mukherjee and Zaldokas
[2017]and Atanassov and Liu [2016] exploit the effect of staggered changes in state-level corporate
tax rates on innovation behavior of publicly listed firms in the United States, and find significant
impact of taxes on innovation, mainly through relieving firms’ financial constraints. In two recent
working papers, Akcigit and Stantcheva [2018] uses data on both inventors and firms and shows
that higher personal and corporate income taxes negatively affect innovation; Chen et al. [2021]
finds that cutting corporate taxes for high-tech companies significantly improved firm productivity
and RD investment in China. Our paper differs from those papers in several ways. First, we are the
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first paper to look at the impact of changes in tax enforcement rather than explicit tax reduction on
firms’ innovation behavior. Second, our data covers a broad range of firms and a comprehensive
set of innovation outcomes, and we answer the question in a developing-country’s context. Sec-
ond, the paper relates to the literature on the determinants of innovation. Existing evidence shows
that product market competition [Aghion and Howitt, 2005], institutional ownership [Aghion and
Zingales, 2013, Ferreira and Silva, 2014], minimum wage [Geng et al. 2018], laws [Acharya and
Subramanian, 2014], investors’ attitudes towards failure [Tian and Wang, 2011], managerial in-
centive [Manso, 2011], and financial development and regulation [Hsu and Xu, 2014, Amore and
Žaldokas, 2013, Fang and Tice, 2014, Cornaggia and Wolfe, 2015], all affect innovation. An-
other branch of papers study the effect of RD tax credit or subsidies on RD investment [Hall and
Reenen, 2000, Bloom and Reenen, 2002, Wilson, 2009, Rao, 2016]. We contribute to this liter-
ature by showing that corporate tax policies are also a first order determinant of firm innovation.
Third, the paper also contributes to the literature on tax enforcement. The tax-to-GDP ratio is
substantially lower in poor countries compared with developed countries [Gordon and Li, 2009,
Besley and Persson, 2014]. One important reason of low tax revenue is weak tax enforcement,
and several theory papers suggest that policy-makers can use tax enforcement instead of explicitly
changing tax rates as a tax instrument [Kaplow, 2016]. There are a growing number of papers
showing that tax enforcement can be improved by providing performance pay incentives to tax
inspectors [Besley and Rosen, 1999a, Khan et al., 2019], introducing third party reporting to im-
prove information available on tax payers [Naritomi, 2019, Pomeranz, 2015], and offering auditing
[Slemrod and Christian, 2001]. However, another important but not well-explored factor affecting
tax enforcement is the incentive of local governments and tax agencies. Chen [2017] uses China’s
2005 agricultural tax abolition as a natural experiment to study the impact of county governments’
incentives on tax enforcement, and shows that the revenue loss is largely offset by tougher tax
enforcement on value-added taxes. Our study adds to this literature by showing that the manage-
ment and incentives of tax collection agencies play an important role in tax enforcement and the
tax capacity of a country. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
background of China’s tax collection system and the reform. Section 3 presents data and summary




3.2.1 China’s Tax collection system
Before the economic reform started in 1979, tax administration in China was simple because there
were no personal or corporate income taxes. Most of the tax revenues came from profit remittance
of state-owned enterprises. Local governments were in responsible for tax collection, but all rev-
enues were consolidated to the central government, who sets spending priorities and redistributes
the revenue based on local spending needs. Such a system, called “unified revenue collection and
unified spending” (also known as “eating from one big pot”), provides very little incentives for
the local government to develop their local economies. In 1980, the “fiscal contracting system”
(also known as “eating from separate kitchens”) was introduced. Under this system, local revenue
was divided between the central and local governments based on pre-determined sharing schemes.
The new system not only guaranteed the central government a certain flow of revenue from local
governments, but also provided local governments with incentives to build up local economies and
the revenue base. The share of local expenditure increased from 45% of the total in 1981 to 72% in
1993. However, since the sharing rule can be continuously negotiated and changed, local govern-
ments view this as a lack of commitment from the central government and they tend to divert funds
from budgetary to extra-budgetary revenues, which were not subjected to sharing with the central
government. Since the central government relies on local authorities to collect tax, it is hard to
monitor and correct such manipulation. From 1980 to 1992, the extra-budgetary revenue to bud-
getary revenue ratio increased from 48% to 120%. This greatly dampened the central government’s
fiscal capacity. In order to strengthen the central government’s control on taxation, a major fiscal
system reform was introduced in 1994. In the reform, taxes were classified into central, local and
shared taxes, which explicitly specified the tax sharing rules between the central and local govern-
ments. Specifically, the central taxes include customs duties and consumption taxes; the local taxes
include corporate income taxes, real estate and property taxes; and the shared taxes include value-
added taxes (75% central, 25% local) and personal income tax. Moreover, the central government
also established its own tax-collection department to centralize the revenue system, preventing the
local governments from intervening central and shared taxes. Since then, the tax collection system
is divided into two bureaus: the state tax bureau and local tax bureau. The state tax bureau col-
lects central taxes and shared taxes, while the local tax bureau collects local taxes. Both bureaus
have branches on the province, city, and county levels. The most significant difference between
these two bureaus is in the management system. The state tax bureau adopts a vertical reporting
model: each state tax bureau is directly responsible for the tax bureau at level above. For example,
the director of a province-level state tax bureau is appointed by the director of the State Bureau
of General Taxation (headquarter of the state tax bureau); the provincial government have very
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limited power on the state tax bureau of any level. In contrast, the local tax bureau is managed
by the local government: the provincial government manages the province-level local tax bureau,
appoints their director and provides funding for operation. Under such a system, the interference
of local governments in the collection of central and shared taxes is minimized.
3.2.2 The corporate income tax collection reform in 2002
Since the 1994 tax reform, the local tax bureau collects the corporate income tax of all firms except
for foreign and state-owned enterprises, and all the revenue goes to local government. In 2001, the
central government decided to change the corporate income tax to a shared tax. The main objec-
tive of the reform was to raise additional central tax revenue to support the “western development
strategy” proposed in the year 1999. The plan was to promote the growth of the underdeveloped
western provinces, which would need financial transfers from the east. Since all shared taxes
should be collected by the central government, a collection reform also needs to be implemented.
The government was planning to switch the collection of corporate income tax of all firms to the
state tax bureau. However, because local and state tax bureaus use completely different tax collec-
tion and record systems, it was very difficult to transfer the tax collection on existing firms. As a
result, only new firms established after 2002 were covered by the tax collection reform. In January
2002, the corporate income tax collection reform was implemented, which switched corporate in-
come tax collection of all domestic private firms established on or after January 1, 2002, to state
tax bureau. However, the tax collection for firms registered before 2002 did not change. The re-
form was a shock for firms, because the decision was not made until December 2001. This is very
important for our identification: it ensured that firms did not have enough time to manipulate their
registration time. After the reform, similar firms established before or after 2002 could pay very
different tax rates because of the following reasons. First, the incentives of corporate tax collection
were different between the local and central tax bureaus. Just as the target of GDP growth rate is
set by the central government every year, tax collection agencies are also assigned with a targeted
tax growth rate, and whether the target can be achieved or not may influence the promotion of
the tax bureau leaders. As Chen (2017) suggested, local government tend to raise tax revenue by
stronger enforcement if they face revenue loss. The collection reform broadened the tax base for
the state tax bureau, while local tax agencies lose potential tax revenue from new firms to fulfill
the target, so they have more incentives to enforce corporate tax collection on old firms after the
reform. Second, the local tax bureau is managed by the local government, so they have more power
and information on local firms, which may help to enforce tax collection. However, although local
tax bureaus have more incentives and information advantages to enforce corporate tax collection,
local governments may protect local firms for long-term growth by encouraging local tax bureaus
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to loosen the enforcement of tax collection or by offering favorable tax policies . As a result, the
tax collection reform may have either positive or negative effects on firms’ tax rate.
3.3 Data and Summary Statistics
The empirical analysis is based on two main data sources. The first one is the annual firm survey
data developed and maintained by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS). The NBS data
contain annual survey data of all “above scale” industrial firms with annual sales of more than 5
million RMB. On average, around 220,000 firms per year from 1998 to 2007 are included in the
dataset, spanning 37 manufacturing industries and 31 provinces or province-equivalent municipal
cities. Firms included in this survey accounted for almost 50% of China’s industrial value-added,
and 22% of China’s urban employment in 2005. The original dataset includes 2,226,104 firm-year
observations. Since this paper focuses on manufacturing firms, we eliminate non-manufacturing
observations. Moreover, because only firms established in and after the year 2002 were covered
by the tax collection reform, we only use firm survey data from 2002 to 2007. We also excluded
firms in Shanghai, Tibet, and foreign firms because they are not covered by the reform. To further
clean the sample, we deleted observations where firm identifiers, county code, sector id, or year
of establishment are missing, as well as observations whose value of fixed assets or total sales is
below RMB 5 million, or if the number of employees is smaller than 30. In addition, observations
are dropped if total assets are less than liquid assets or total fixed assets, if inputs are larger than
output, if the firm is less than one year old, or if key variables such as corporate tax, input and
total wages are negative or zero. After implementing these data cleaning procedures, we obtain a
sample of 473,255 observations for analysis. The second data source is patent data from the State
Intellectual Property Office (SIPO). We obtained all the records of patents approved as of May
1, 2014, from SIPO. The database contains 4,060,392 observations covering all patents applied
in China, including 1,097,000 invention patents, 1,620,069 utility model patents, and 1,343,323
design patents. A typical patent entry includes the following information: application number,
patent name, applicant, inventor, application date, publishing date, granting date, main Interna-
tional Patent Classification (IPC) number, filing agent’s name and institution, applicant address,
patent origin (provinces in China or other countries), and a short description of the patent. We
also have characteristics of patent including number of characters in the application file, number
of claims and exclusivities, number of figures. We don’t have citation data because SIPO began to
track citations only in recent years. We use firm name, address, and CEO name to merge the patent
data with the firm survey data. In Table 1, we provide summary statistics for key variables. In our
sample, about 45.3% firms are private firms established after January 2002, and thus received the
policy treatment. Panel A on firm characteristics shows that in the year 2007, average firm age was
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about 8.09 years, and that 76.4% of firms were domestic private enterprises. We also have about
1.4% State-owned enterprises and 22.2% foreign firms in the sample, who are not influenced by
the reform regardless of whether they were registered before or after 2002. The average firm size
was about 184 employees, and firms export about 16.7% of their sales. Panel B presents data on
accounting measures of firm performance. Average sales were 66.76 million RMB (about 10 mil-
lion USD), and the average output was 68.46 million RMB. While firms remit three major types of
taxes, including value-added tax, corporate income tax, and business tax, only corporate income
tax was affected by the tax collection policy reform. We thus focus on this type of tax in the paper
and define the tax rate as the corporate income tax to sales ratio. In the year 2007 the average tax
rate was about 1.13%. We use sales instead of profit to measure the tax rate for two reasons. First,
there are many zero or negative values of profit; second, firms may underreport profits in order to
pay less tax. Differences in tax enforcement could affect the possibility of misreporting. If weaker
enforcement makes it easier for some firms to evade tax by reporting less profit, the tax to profit ra-
tio cannot capture the variation of tax rate due to changes in enforcement. In Table A1 and Figures
A1 and A2, we show that firms established after 2002 report more costs and less profit (columns
(1) and (2)), while there’s no significant difference in imputed profit between firms established be-
fore and after 2002 (column (3)), suggesting that tax avoidance (defined as the difference between
imputed and reported profit) is higher among new firms (column (4)). Panel C reports measures
of innovation. We use three indicators of innovation. The first and main indicator we look at is
firm-level patent applications. The data shows that during the three years 2007 to 2010, 7.1%
firms applied for patents; and among those firms, the average number of patent application was
about 8.86 and the approved number of patent was around 2.52. The second indicator is the RD
expenditure. In the NBS firm survey data, information on RD expenses is only available in years
2005-2007, and the average RD expenditure to sales ratio in year 2007 was around 0.002. Lastly,
we also look at the skilled labor ratio, defined as the share of workers with an above-college-level
degree. Information on worker education is only available in the year 2004, and the average skilled
labor ratio is 0.11.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
The main challenge of identifying the causal impact of tax rates on firm innovation is that tax
policies can be endogenously determined. Some unobserved factors could affect both tax rate and
innovation. For example, high-tech firms are more likely to innovate and can normally get RD tax
reductions from the local government; more productive firms are more advanced in technology and
may also be more skillful managing taxations. Reverse causality is also a problem: more innovative
firms charge higher product prices and make more profits at the same sales level. The introduction
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of the corporate income tax collection reform was only targeted on private firms established after
the year 2002. If the reform indeed changed tax enforcement, two firms established before or after
January 2002 but which are otherwise similar should face significantly different tax rates. In that
case, we can use the regression discontinuity (RD) design to identify the impact of taxes on firm
innovation. The key assumption of the RD analysis is that firm cohort should have a significant
impact on the corporate tax rate; however, all other unobserved determinants of firm innovation
are not correlated with firm cohort. With this assumption held, causal inference could be achieved
after adjusting for a sufficiently flexible polynomial of cohort. We firstly check whether the policy
reform has any impact on firm tax rate. In Figure 1, we restrict the sample to firms established
right before (2001) and after (2002) the reform and compare their tax rates. The figure suggests
that firms established after the reform pay lower taxes in all years after 2003. We then plot the
tax rate by firm birth month, normalized by setting December 2001 as 0, using the 2007 data and
focusing on firms that were born two years before or after the policy change. As shown in Figure
2, the tax rate paid by firms formed after 2002 is significantly lower than that of firms established
before 2002. To check whether such discontinuity in tax rate was driven by the tax collection
reform rather than other policy changes, we also plot the figure using a sample of foreign firms,
who are not supposed to be affected by the reform. Figure 3 shows that among foreign firms, the
tax rate is not influenced by firm establishment year. Moreover, value-added tax should not be
affected by the reform because it is always remitted to state tax bureau. Figure 4 shows that the
value-added tax rate is not affected by firm cohort as well. To show whether the impact of the
reform on tax rate is statistically significant, we estimate the following equation:
TaxRateit = α0 + α1Treatmenti + α2F (Age)it + α3Xit + εit (3.1)
Here i indexes firms, t indexes years, and TaxRateit is the corporate income tax to sales ratio.
Treatmenti is an indicator for the policy treatment, which is time-invariant and equals one if
the firm was established after January 2002. F (Age)it is a polynomial function of firm birth
month, where birth month is normalized by setting December 2001 as zero. We also include
the interactions of the treatment variable with polynomial terms. Xit is a set of firm characteristics
including capital to labor ratio, number of employees, export to sales ratio, and foreign share. Table
2 reports the results. The three columns present results using a 60-, 48-, or 24-months window,
respectively. As we discussed in the background section, the reform may have either a positive or
negative effect on tax enforcement. Results suggest that the negative impact dominates: the tax
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rate is about 0.1% lower among firms established after 2002. Since the average tax rate was about
0.011 before 2002, this suggests that the reform reduced the tax rate by almost 10% . Although
we observe a significant discontinuity in tax rate around the policy cutoff on firm birth month, this
could be driven by the fact that firms anticipated the policy change and selectively postponed their
registration date. To check whether that is the case, we use the 2007 data to plot the density of firm
birth month in Figure 5. The result shows that there’s no significant difference in firm entry around
2002. In addition, we also check whether firms re-registered after the reform to take advantage of
the policy. We define re-registration by firms with the same name and owner but a different ID in
different years. Figure 6 plots the distribution of re-registration for firms observed in 1998. We
don’t see significantly higher re-registration after 2002. Lastly, another identification assumption
is that all unobserved determinants of firm innovation are continuously related to the firm birth
month. Figure 7 graphically assesses this by testing whether the predicted number of patents,
calculated as the fitted value from an OLS regression of patenting on all covariates in subsequent
regressions , differs between firms born before or after January 2002. The figure suggests that
there is no significant discontinuity in the predicted number of patent at the firm cohort cutoff.
Based on the above evidence, we believe that in our context RD is a valid identification strategy.
Since the policy rule relating firm birth time to treatment is not deterministic but only changed
the probability of tax enforcement changes, we apply a fuzzy regression discontinuity estimation,
instrumenting firm tax rate by the reform. Specifically, to estimate the impact of the tax reform on
firm innovation, we run the following 2SLS regression :
Innovationit = β0 + β1 ˆTaxRateit + β2F (Age)it + β3Xit + νit (3.2)
Where Innovationit is an outcome variable measuring firm innovation behavior, such as the
number of patent applications, RD expenditure, or skilled-labor ratio. TaxRateit is instrumented
by the policy treatment (first-stage in equation (3.1)), and represents the fitted values from esti-
mating equation (1). Our coefficient of interest is β1, which measures the impact of changes in tax
rate on firm innovation.
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3.5 Results
3.5.0.1 Effect of Taxes on Firm Innovation
We firstly provide graphical evidence in Figure 8, which plots the number of patent applications
against firm birth month. The figure shows that there is a discrete increase in patent applications at
the firm age cutoff, which mirrors the decrease in the tax rate as shown in Figure 2. Figures 2 and
8 reveal a sharp decrease in taxes and a sharp increase in patenting at precisely the cutoff of firm
cohort that was influenced by the tax collection reform. Table 3 reports the 2SLS estimation results
for patent as the indicator of firm innovation . Starting with columns (1)-(3), where the outcome
is the probability of applying for a patent, results show that a higher tax rate has a significantly
negative effect on innovation, and the effect becomes stronger as time evolves. We mainly focus
on the patent applications for the next 3 years because innovation is a process that needs long-term
investment, and many innovating firms do not apply for patents every year. Specifically, column
(3) suggests that, increasing the tax rate by one standard deviation (0.0122) can decrease the prob-
ability of having any patent application in the next 3 years by more than 10%. Similarly, column
(6) shows that the average number of patent application increased by a significant 5.7% if the tax
rate decreased by 0.01 . In Table 4, we explore another two indicators of firm innovation: RD
expenditure and human capital. Results suggest that firms facing higher corporate taxes spend less
money on RD and hire less skilled labor, although the impact on RD expenditure is not statistically
significant. Please note that the sample size is smaller in this table because we only have RD expen-
ditures in years 2005-2007 and worker education information in the year 2004. To further rule out
the concern that the effect might be driven by confounding variables, we use pseudo regressions
to test those possibilities. In practice, we generate policy dummies and replicate the regressions
in Tables 2. The results in Table A4 suggest that if the cutoff is not 2002, we don’t see a drop in
the tax rate, suggesting that the policy effect is not just by chance. In summary, the results show
a strong and robust causal relationship between tax rate and firm innovation. The tax collection
reform reduced tax enforcement, and the resulting lower tax rate stimulated both input (measured
by RD expenditure and human capital) and output (measured by the number of patent application)
of firm innovation . While the quantity of innovation is important, the quality of innovation is also
crucial. We use two ways to measure the quality of innovation . First, the type of patent is a good
indicator of the value of patent. There are three main types of patent in China: invention, utility,
and design patent. The invention patent is the most difficult one because it needs to contribute very
original ideas. For a utility patent, there must be some significant improvement to an existing prod-
uct or technology. The design patent only requires a modification in product appearance . Among
the merged data we have, 16.6% are invention patents, 35.0% are utility patents, and 48.4% are
design patents. We use the same 2SLS specification in equation (2) to test the impact of taxes on
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the likelihood and number of different types of patent applications. Table 5 presents the results.
The impact of tax reform on patent applications mainly comes from its effect on invention and util-
ity patents: decreasing the tax rate by one standard deviation (0.0122) improves the probability of
having an invention patent application by 4.4% and increases the number of utility patent applica-
tions by 4.7%. This suggests that the improvement in innovation outcomes is not merely driven by
the low-quality design patents. Second, we also use the detailed information of patent applications
as proxies for the patent quality, including number of claims, number of independent claims , and
the amount of effort that was spent on the patent application (length of the application document,
number of figures, and length of abstract). In our patent data, only invention and utility patents
have the above information, and results in Table 6 suggest that a reduction in tax rate significantly
improved patent quality. Overall, the above results show that the tax reform not only increased the
quantity of patents, but also improved the quality of innovation activities.
3.5.1 Mechanisms
After seeing a positive and significant impact of a tax rate reduction on firm innovation, the next
question is: Why is firm innovation affected by the tax reform? Since RD expenditure is not
fully tax deductible in our context, a direct explanation is that lower tax rate reduced the user cost
of RD, so that the optimal level of RD investment increased. We also test two other potential
mechanisms here. First, if firms are under financial constraints so that they do not have enough
funding to invest on innovation, reducing tax cost can help by alleviating financial constraint, and
firms can use the money saved to carry out innovation activities. Under a neoclassical framework,
if RD expenditure is fully deductible, the tax rate should not affect innovation since it does not
change the after-tax marginal benefit and cost of innovation. However, when the financial market
is incomplete or inefficient and a firm mostly relies on its own after-tax profit, a lower tax rate
could affect innovation investment. One challenge to test this channel is that it is hard to measure
financial constraint. Fowling Cai and Liu [2009], we use the financial charges, which mainly
include interest payment and fees, as the indicator for access to credit. From the late 1990s to the
mid 2000s, although the Chinese economy had been growing at a very fast pace and firms’ credit
demand grew rapidly, the banking sector and stock market had not developed quickly enough
to keep pace with this growing demand. Thus Chinese firms were usually facing severe credit
constraints. At the same time, banks in China have little discretion over interest rates they can
charge and the corporate bond market is thin due to strict regulations. Therefore, our measure of
access to credit reflects mostly how much a firm manages to borrow, not its endogenously chosen
optimal capital structure. We test the financial constraint channel using the following estimation
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equation:
Innovationit = γ0 + γ1TaxRateit + γ2AccessToCreditit + γ3TaxRateit ∗AccessToCreditit +
γ4F (Age)it + γ5Xit + µit (3.3)
Where TaxRateit is instrumented by the policy treatment, Access to Creditit is calculated by
the ratio of financial charges to total assets. Our coefficient of interest is γ3, which measures the
variation of the policy impact by firm financial constraint. Results in Table 7 suggest that firms
which face more severe financial constraint are more hindered by a higher high tax rate. The
coefficient in front of the interaction between TaxRateit and AccessToCreditit is significantly
positive for patent outcomes. This result suggests that a low tax rate can stimulate firms’ innovation
by alleviating financial constraints. Second, a lower tax rate could also release resources that firms
spend on tax avoidance, which firms can in turn use on innovation. In that case, firms that are
doing more tax avoidance can release more resources for innovation. To test this channel, we
look at whether the pocicy impact changes with tax avoidance activities. We define tax avoidance
by the difference between imputed and reported profit, and assume that firms spend more on tax
avoidance if the gap is larger. Following the same estimation strategy as in equation (3), we then
estimate the heterogeneity of the tax impact by tax avoidance. Results in Table 8 show that for all
the four measures of firm innovation, the coefficient of the interaction between the tax rate and the
tax avoidance measure is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that that lower tax rate
has a stronger positive impact on innovation if firms are doing more tax avoidance. This is in line
with the tax avoidance mechanism.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we offer new evidence on the impact of corporate taxes on both the quantity and qual-
ity of firm innovation, and the underlying mechanisms. To estimate the causal impact of taxes on
innovation, we take advantage of a tax collection reform applied to manufacturing firms in China
established after the year 2002, which switched the collection of corporate income taxes from the
local tax bureau to the state tax bureau. Based on a comprehensive dataset of all medium and large
enterprises combined with the universal patent application data in China, we use a regression dis-
continuity design to study the policy impact. Our results suggest that, first, the reform effectively
changed tax enforcement and reduced the tax rate by 10%. Using the number of patent applica-
tions, RD expenditure, and skilled labor ratio as indicators of firm innovation, we then show that
there is a strong and robust causal relationship between tax rate and firm innovation: decreasing the
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tax rate by one standard deviation (0.01) can increase the average number of patent applications by
a significant 5.7%. The reform also improved RD expenditures and increased the skilled-labor ra-
tio. Moreover, the impact of the reform on patenting mainly comes from its effect on the invention
and utility patent, suggesting that the improvement in innovation outcomes is not merely driven by
low-quality design patents. Lastly, we show that a low tax rate can stimulate firm’s innovation by
alleviating financial constraints and reallocating resources from tax avoidance activities.
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3.7 Figures
Figure 3.1: Tax Rate of Firms Established in 2001 and 2002
Note: This figure plots the tax rate in years 2004-2007 for firms established in years 2001 and 2002.
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Figure 3.2: Tax Rate by Firm Birth Month
Note: This figure is based on data in the year 2007 and compares the tax rate paid by firms
established before and after the policy change. Birth month of firms established in December
2001 is normalized to 0.
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Figure 3.3: Tax Rate by Firm Birth Month: Foreign Firms
Note: This figure is based on data in the year 2007 and includes foreign firms only. It compares
the tax rate paid by firms established before and after the policy change. Birth month of firms
established in December 2001 is normalized to 0.
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Figure 3.4: Value Added Tax Rate by Firm Birth Month
Note: This figure is based on data in the year 2007 and compares the value-added tax rate paid by
firms established before and after the policy change. Birth month of firms established in December
2001 is normalized to 0.
Figure 3.5: Density of Firm Birth Month
Note: This figure is based on data in the year 2007. Birth month of firms established in December
2001 is normalized to 0.
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Figure 3.6: Distribution of Firm Re-registration
Note: This figure plots the distribution of re-registration for firms observed in 1998. Reregistration
is defined as one for firms with the same name and owner but a different ID in different years.
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Figure 3.7: Predicted Number of Patent Application by Firm Birth Month
Note: This figure is based on data in the year 2007 and compares the predicted number of patent
applications (rescaled by firm size) by firms established before and after the policy change. The
predicted number of patent applications is calculated as the fitted value from an OLS regression of
patenting on covariates including capital to labor ratio, number of employees, export to sales ratio,
and foreign share. Birth month of firms established in December 2001 is normalized to 0. Unit:
Number of patent per 1M Yuan.
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Figure 3.8: Number of Patent Application by Firm Birth Month
Note: This figure is based on data in the year 2007 and compares the number of patent applications
(rescaled by firm size) by firms established before and after the policy change. Birth month of
firms established in December 2001 is normalized to 0. Unit: Number of patent per 1M Yuan.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of Key Variables
Mean Standard Deviation
Policy Treatment 0.45 0.50
Panel A: Firm Characteristics (Year 2007)
Firm Age 8.09 7.26
Ownership - State Owned Enterprises 0.01 0.12
Ownership - Domestic Private Firms 0.76 0.43
Ownership - Foreign Firms 0.22 0.41
Number of Employee 184.20 232.60
Expoert to Sales Ratio 0.17 0.34
Panel B: Accounting (Year 2007)
Sales (1,000 RMB) 66,757 109,953
Output (1,000 RMB) 68,462 112,443
Fixed Assets (1,000 RMB) 13,641 31,461
Corporate Income Tax to Sales Ratio 0.011 0.012
Panel C: Innovation
Patent Applications (2007-2010)
Share of Firms Applied for Patent (%) 7.10 0.26
Average Number of Patent Application 8.86 24.68
Average Number of Approved Patent 2.52 5.39
R&D Expenditure/Sales (Year 2007) 0.002 0.016
Skilled Labor Ratio (Year 2004) 0.111 0.155
Note: Policy treatment equals one for firms established after the year 2002, and zero otherwise.
3.8 Tables
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Table 3.2: Effect of the Tax Reform on Tax Rate
Tax to Sales Ratio
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment -0.00072*** -0.00098*** -0.00089**
(=1 if birth year>2002) (0.00022) (0.00028) (0.00034)
Window 60 months 48 months 24 months
Number of Observation 178188 131515 67323
R-Squared 0.072 0.072 0.076
Note: This table reports the impact of the tax reform on the effective tax rate. Columns (1) to
(3) use sample firms established 3, 2, or 1 year before and after the reform, respectively. Firm
characteristics including capital to labor ratio, number of employees, export to sales ratio, and
foreign share are controlled for in all regressions. Age, square of age, and their interactions with















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.4: Impact of the Tax Reform on Firm Innovation: R&D Expenditure and Skilled Labor
R&D/Total Assets Skilled Labor Ratio
(1) (2)
Tax to Sales Ratio -0.273 -0.394**
(0.294) (0.167)
Window 48 Months 48 Months
Number of Observation 93024 28034
Pre-2002 Mean of Dependent Variable 0.002 0.102
Note: This table uses sample of firms established two years before or after the policy reform. The
tax to sales ratio is instrumented by the policy treatment dummy (=0 for firms established before
2002, and =1 otherwise). Column (1) is based on survey data in year 2005-2007 because data on
RD expenditure is only available in those years; column (2) uses data in year 2004 which includes
skilled labor information. Skilled labor ratio is defined as the sahre of workers with an above
college degree. Firm characteristics including capital to labor ratio, number of employees, export
to sales ratio, and foreign share are controlled for in all regressions. Age, square of age, and their











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix in Chapter One
Figure A.1: Car Sales in Major Markets
Note: This figure demonstrates passenger car pr
[Source] http://www.oica.net/category/sales-statistics/
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Figure A.2: World Car Production in 2018
Note: This figure demonstrates passenger car production in 2018
[Source] http://www.oica.net/category/sales-statistics/
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Figure A.3: Google Search Index for ”Car Acquisition Tax”
Note: [Source] Google trend
Figure A.4: Baidu Search Index for ”Car Acquisition Tax”
Note: [Source] Google trend
97
Figure A.5: Screenshot from the most popular phone app for car information in China
Note: [Source] From Phone App ”Dongchedi”
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Figure A.6: Consumer Confidence Index and Large Car Sales
[Source] Calculated by authors from car sales data
Figure A.7: Consumer Confidence Index and Small Car Sales














































































































































































































































































Figure A.10: National Average Gas Retail Price
Note: [Source] Calculated by authors from car sales data and Fuel efficient data
102
Figure A.11: Relationship between Price and Gas Consumption (MPG)
Note: [Source] Calculated by authors from car sales data Fuel efficient data
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APPENDIX B
Appendix in Chapter Three
Figure B.1: Cost By Firm Birth Month
Note: This figure is based on data in the year 2007 and compares the total cost of firms established
before and after the policy change. Birth month of firms established in December 2001 is
normalized to 0.
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Figure B.2: Profit By Firm Birth Month
Note: This figure is based on data in the year 2007 and compares the profit of firms established
before and after the policy change. Birth month of firms established in December 2001 is
normalized to 0.
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Table B.1: Pseudo Test
Tax to Sales Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Policy Dummy 2000 0.000858***
(=1 if year>2000, =0 otherwise) (0.00)
Policy Dummy 2001 (0.00)
(=1 if year>2001, =0 otherwise) (0.00)
Policy Dummy 2003 0.00
(=1 if year>2003, =0 otherwise) (0.00)
Policy Dummy 2004 0.000641***
(=1 if year>2004, =0 otherwise) (0.00)
Window 48 Months 48 Months 48 Months 48 Months
Number of Observation 120954 127805 117706 96016
R-Squared 0.071 0.073 0.074 0.078
Note: This table uses sample of firms established two years before or after the policy reform. Firm
characteristics including capital to labor ratio, number of employees, export to sales ratio, and
foreign share are controlled for in all regressions. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Patent Application (1=Yes, 0=No) Log (Number of Patent Application)
Next Year Next 2 Years Next 3 Years Next Year Next 2 Years Next 3 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tax to Sales Ratio -2.063*** -3.877*** -6.802*** -3.110** -4.098 -10.12***
(-3.04) (-3.56) (-3.88) (-2.13) (-1.57) (-3.12)
Window 72 Month 72 Month 72 Month 72 Month 72 Month 72 Month
Number of Observation 178188 178188 178188 178188 178188 178188
Pre-2002 Mean of Dependent Variable 0.0202662 0.0347975 0.0495649 0.083779 0.201204 0.351908
Note: This table uses sample of firms established three years before or after the policy reform and
reports the impact of the tax reform on patent application. The tax to sales ratio is instrumented
by the policy treatment dummy (=0 for firms established before 2002, and =1 otherwise). Firm
characteristics including capital to labor ratio, number of employees, export to sales ratio, and
foreign share are controlled for in all regressions. Age, square of age, and their interactions with
the treatment dummy are also included. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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